Sunday, 18 July 2021

Lavie Tidhar (ed) "The Best of World SF: Part 1" (2021)


The question is: how to review collections of short fiction? That may not be your question. You, let’s say, may prefer to know—with respect to the volume here under consideration, Lavie Tidhar’s The Best of World SF Volume 1 (Head of Zeus 2021)—is it any good? If that is your question then I can tell you: yes, it’s very good. It's a superbly varied collection of SF, Fantasy and slipstream short stories, absorbing and stimulating and readable. This is where SF is nowadays: a global discourse, a splendid diversity, no longer in the hands of a small group of straight, white US and UK men. Tidhar's collection works both as a primer, for those interested in exploring a more diverse range of SFnal voices, and as a collection on its own terms, just as a gathering of really good SFnal shorts.

OK, very good. What else should a review provide? There are twenty-six stories here, some quite lengthy, which makes the book (I read it in processed-tree, real-world form) hard on the wrists, and awkward to schlep about in your manbag or other carryall; though presumably it is as weightless on kindle as any other e-book, which may be your preferred mode. If you’d like your review to carry a little more detail, information-wise, here’s isfdb’s list of the constituents: 


Click to embiggen. These stories are from, respectively, France, China, Singapore, Botswana, Nigeria, India, China, Singapore, Japan, Italy, Cuba, United Kingdom/Nigeria, Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago, Spain, Mexico, Finland, Israel, Iceland, Russia, India, Ghana, South Africa, Sweden, Mexico and Malaysia, which is a pretty good spread, although there are some omissions (nothing by a German author, nothing Australian, although SFF is huge in both territories/languages). 14 women, 12 men is a healthy balance too. I have in my time had some small involvements in edited collections of things, on both sides of the process, and I am nothing short of boggled at what Tidhar has accomplished here: all the regular problems of corralling a varied selection of interesting material with the added problems of navigating translations, international rights and so on. 

Is that a review of this book? It doesn’t tell you very much: some factual description, some praise. Is that enough to be a review, do you think? I could go through the list of stories judging each, perhaps giving each a star rating out of five, but to what extent would that really add value? It seems to me it would instead drive the review to that place where fine-grainedness intrudes into sheer tedium ... notating my personal quirks of taste so that, what? You could read the collection, come up with your own list of preferences and judgments, and check them against mine? Why on earth would you want to do something so fruitless? I liked some of the stories more than others, which, since the alternative would be ‘I liked each story exactly as much as every other story’, isn’t saying anything substantive, now, is it?

***

Short stories used to be a huge part of literary culture: many magazines (Argosy, Strand Magazine, New Yorker) existed to deliver them to eager readers. Short story magazines still exist of course, but now they muster a tiny fraction of circulation of those giants in their heyday. We have gone off short story writing. This happened, I think, in different phases: the bloom departed from ‘straight’ short stories in the early 20th-century, where science fiction Pulp magazines continued healthily through to the 1930s and into the 1940s. Indeed there are those, I daresay, those who think of the short story as the ideal science-fictional mode: enough space to present a novum, to frame a thought-experiment, to stage it, dramatize it with a small cast of strongly-drawn characters, but not so as to outstay its welcome or hang heavy on the reader, just enough to put the core conceit under the lens for the reader. But the fact is SF, like general fiction, is a book-length business now (although, if it comes to that, SF is really a film-and-TV-and-video-game business now, but that’s a separate issue). H G Wells wrote a lot of brilliant SF shorts in the 1890s, and then more or less abandoned the mode in the 20th-century. One late example of him in this mode is the peerless short ‘The Country of the Blind’. When he oversaw the publication of a greatest-hits collection of his shorts in 1911 he included this as the title piece: The Country of the Blind and Other Stories. In that volume's preface Wells notes that ‘the task of selection and revision’ entailed by editing it brought home to him ‘with something of the effect of discovery’ that
I was once an industrious writer of short stories, and that I am no longer anything of the kind. I have not written one now for quite a long time, and in the past five or six years I have made scarcely one a year. The bulk of the fifty or sixty tales from which this present three-and-thirty have been chosen dates from the last century. This edition is more definitive than I supposed when first I arranged for it. In the presence of so conclusive an ebb and cessation an almost obituary manner seems justifiable.
He goes on to speculate as to why he has, in effect, stopped writing short stories. Such writing used to come to him as easily as leaves to the tree:
I find it a little difficult to disentangle the causes that have restricted the flow of these inventions. It has happened, I remark, to others as well as to myself, and in spite of the kindliest encouragement to continue from editors and readers. There was a time when life bubbled with short stories; they were always coming to the surface of my mind, and it is no deliberate change of will that has thus restricted my production. ... I found that, taking almost anything as a starting-point and letting my thoughts play about it, there would presently come out of the darkness, in a manner quite inexplicable, some absurd or vivid little incident more or less relevant to that initial nucleus. Little men in canoes upon sunlit oceans would come floating out of nothingness, incubating the eggs of prehistoric monsters unawares; violent conflicts would break out amidst the flower-beds of suburban gardens; I would discover I was peering into remote and mysterious worlds ruled by an order logical indeed but other than our common sanity.
Here he inserts a potted recent history of the form: the 1890s were ‘a good and stimulating period for a short-story writer’ with great work being produced almost continually by a whole tribe of short-story writers (‘Barrie, Stevenson, Frank-Harris; Max Beerbohm; Henry James; George Street, Morley Roberts, George Gissing, Ella d'Arcy, Murray Gilchrist, E. Nesbit, Stephen Crane, Joseph Conrad, Edwin Pugh, Jerome K. Jerome, Kenneth Graham, Arthur Morrison, Marriott Watson, George Moore, Grant Allen, George Egerton, Henry Harland, Pett Ridge, W. W. Jacobs and Joseph Conrad’), all led by Kipling: ‘Mr. Kipling had made his astonishing advent with a series of little blue-grey books, whose covers opened like window-shutters to reveal the dusty sun-glare and blazing colours of the East’. Wells thinks that's all passed away now:
I do not think the present decade can produce any parallel to this list, or what is more remarkable, that the later achievements in this field of any of the survivors from that time, with the sole exception of Joseph Conrad, can compare with the work they did before 1900.
There's an interesting discussion to be had, I think, as to whether Wells is right in his larger literary-historical diagnosis; but it can't be denied that it describes his own career as a short story writer. Despite being one of the true masters of the form, the inspiration of Borges and generations of SF authors, and despite the fact that some of his most enduring literary achievements are to be found amongst his shorts, he wrote no more of them. Why not?

It's not a question that admits of straightforward answer, I fear. He himself blames the figure he calls ‘the à priori critic’:
Just as nowadays he goes about declaring that the work of such-and-such a dramatist is all very amusing and delightful, but “it isn't a Play,” so we' had a great deal of talk about the short story, and found ourselves measured by all kinds of arbitrary standards. There was a tendency to treat the short story as though it was as definable a form as the sonnet, instead of being just exactly what any one of courage and imagination can get told in twenty minutes' reading or so. It was either Mr. Edward Garnett or Mr. George Moore in a violently anti-Kipling mood who invented the distinction between the short story and the anecdote. The short story was Maupassant; the anecdote was damnable. It was a quite infernal comment in its way, because it permitted no defence. Fools caught it up and used it freely. Nothing is so destructive in a field of artistic effort as a stock term of abuse. Anyone could say of any short story, “A mere anecdote,” just as anyone can say “Incoherent!” of any novel or of any sonata that isn't studiously monotonous. The recession of enthusiasm for this compact, amusing form is closely associated in my mind with that discouraging imputation. One felt hopelessly open to a paralysing and unanswerable charge, and one's ease and happiness in the garden of one's fancies was more and more marred by the dread of it. It crept into one's mind, a distress as vague and inexpugnable as a sea fog on a spring morning.
In comes the fog, it seems.

Still: fog, though Wells deplores it, may be part of the unique strength of the short story as a distinct form. In saying so I'm drawing on Timothy Clark's rather brilliant essay ‘Not Seeing the Short Story: A Blind Phenomenology of Reading’, which appeared as part of the Oxford Literary Review's special issue on ‘The Blind Short Story’ in 2004. Clark makes the case for the short story as a specifically blind mode of art, arguing that ‘what I propose to call, non-pejoratively, the “blindness” of the short-story revisits the issue of the form's relation to realism’. A long quotation from Middlemarch demonstrates George Eliot's commitment to as whole a sight as possible. The short story, by contrast, is necessarily determined by its pseudo-poetic brevity:
[Eliot's] passage of character analysis lasts several pages. However, were such a series of paragraphs as that about Lydgate to appear in a short story, might the mechanics of its realism not be more likely to echo back on itself, revealing its tautological basis? This element of the literary, that it actually conjures up what it seems merely to re-present as already there, is something this forms mere brevity—its lack of concretizing context—makes less ignorable. The short story, as they say, is more ‘poetic’. Eliot's effect of subtlety seems to escape this merely self-validating quality through its integration into earlier and later passages of the text. Without that, the kinship between the general ‘human truths’ of such a realist text and the kind of effects of ‘truth’ at work in a horoscope would be clearer. This lack of the trompe-l'oeil effects of a lengthy context constitutes what may be called the relative blindness of the short story. [Clark, ‘Not Seeing the Short Story’ Oxford Literary Review 26 (2004), 8]
Clark goes on to develop a larger phenomenology of blindness and reading, and whilst there's not space to get into all that here, it is, I think, worth drawing out one other point he makes. Metaphors of seeing, according to Clark, pervade short story theory. He finds a remarkable ‘predominance of countervailing metaphors of sight, of the striving to “see” a text whole, the flash of revelation etc’ in the way critics write about the short story form, and quotes one such critic:
‘Visual metaphors’, writes Dominic Head, ‘abound in short story theory, a fact which underlies the “spatial” aspect of the genre, but which also obscures the illusory nature of this aspect.’ The illusion lies in the fact that the visual pattern is constructed from out of the necessarily temporal movement of reading, its working through both memory and anticipation to achieve a seeming ‘overview’ of the text as a whole. Visual metaphors, he argues, often focusing the whole text through some crucial epiphanic moment of ‘insight’—itself usually described as if it were an instance of the miracle of the restoration of sight—repress the heterogeneity and ‘openness’ of a story. [Clark, 9; he is quoting Head, The Modernist Short Story: A Study in Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 10]
This all seems to me interesting in several ways, and although Clark doesn't might have some bearing on Wells's own praxis. Blindness either as a total state, as in ‘The Country of the Blind’ (or cast by the individual out upon the community in the short novel The Invisible Man), or else as a partial restriction or limitation of vision is a recurring theme in Wells's short stories: ‘The Remarkable Case of Davidson's Eyes’, ‘The Plattner Story’, ‘The Crystal Egg’ and many others. Conceivably Wells's increasing dissatisfaction with the short story mode correlated to that belief, which increasingly gripped him as the 1920s and 1920s went on, that he ought to be aiming at a kind of whole sight. His next novel, Marriage (1912), is a positively Eliotian exercise in comprehensive vision, in concretizing context and sheer length—getting on for 600 pages in the first edition (Joan and Peter from 1918 is nearly 800).

No question but it's a shame. Wells blindness was prodigiously more eloquent and resonant than his attempts as clear-sightedness. But he didn't think so, and drew a line under his short story writing. The short story form is the enclosed valley of ‘The Country of the Blind’; it is the sightless but blessed inhabitants of that valley. And the truth of Wells's later career is that he could not rest content in that place, but had to engineer a gigantic rock-fall and the opening of a new breach in the surrounding mountains to be able to scramble back to Realism.

I'd say there's something of that brilliant, creative blindness about the best of the Best of World SF stories Tidhar has gathered: Aliette de Bodard’s ‘Immersion’, an finely written exploration of masks, identity and hiddenness set on a multi-ethnic station, or Hannu Rajaniemi’s ‘His Master’s Voice’, a characteristic piece of posthuman-nanotech worldbuilding that centres an uplifted dog and feeds us the world through this creature’s estranging, limited sensorium. I also liked the creative opacity of Vandana Singh’s time-ghost-haunted ‘Delhi’ and Malena Salazar Maciá’s post-singularity, post-apocalypse, nanobots-are-gods ‘Eyes of the Crocodile’. The blindness of insight, the insight of the blind. Excellent stuff.

-----

Friday, 16 July 2021

Jonathan Meades, "Pedro and Ricky Come Again" (2021)

 



Jonathan Meades is a vastly more stylish writer than Richard Dawkins, but he is as one-dimensional as the geneticist in his atheistic hostility to religion. It is, for him, simply ‘the tyranny of mumbo jumbo’:
A secular cultist who was failing to attract adherents asked Talleyrand what he should do: ‘I would recommend you to be crucified and rise again the third day,’ replied that consummate opportunist. He was, of course, right. Religion is a matter of the survival of the fittest cult. And the fittest cults are those which have equipped themselves with the bulkiest apparatus of irreason — creation myth, miracles, incantations, liturgical quirks, eschatological fictions, sartorial disfigurements, silly hairdos, omniscient others, genital mutilations, dietary proscriptions, and populist iconography.
Jolly stuff, but under-thunk. Meades quotes Clement Attlee’s (as he styles it) ‘sane’ approach to the whole business: ‘believe in the ethics. Can’t accept the mumbo jumbo.’ But plenty of people take their faith along those lines; which is to say, not that they reject the miraculous side, but that they don’t fret or obsess over it. They believe the miraculous stuff not through perversity or contempt for common-sense but via a Newmanesque assent that is indeed a common-sense, with a particular and important emphasis precisely on the common. Attlee’s comment is on-target provided we take ‘ethics’ as more than just a moral code, and understand it more broadly as a community, a way of orienting oneself in life that transcends selfishness and brings meaningfulness— if we understand religious affiliation, in other words, not just as the falsifiable (as Dawkins might say) articles of belief but as the group you worship with, the school community to which your children belong, as involvement in setting up the church fete and running a stall at the jumble sale, as putting money aside for zakat or running a soup-kitchen for the homeless. As, in other words, the social- or communitarian-quotidian alongside the supernatural. Or more particularly, as the quotidian structured and informed — redeemed, to use the Christian term — by the supernatural.

And in fact, in a do-I-contradict-myself-very-well-I-contradict-myself move not untypical of him, Meades’s next paragraph shifts the line of his mockery to go after Anglicanism precisely because it doesn’t avail itself of all the laughable paraphernalia of irreason, although (given that Anglicanism is the third largest Christian global denomination, after Catholicism and the Eastern Orthodox churches) this ought by Meade’s own logic to have doomed it to failure. ‘The shabby ineffectuality of Anglicanism,’ he snipes, ‘derives from having not demanded all that much belief of its congregation, thus containing the germ of its own secularisation. It is an add-on.’

Look: I myself am, as Meades is, an infidel. But there’s something about this kind of thing that strikes me as plain lazy, and worse. Most people alive are religious to one degree or another. It’s we atheists who are the minority. Snark and mockery of this kind is poor form: a betrayal of the common humanity that asks of us respect for others, not despite but because of their differences.

One needn’t be a believer to see that Credo quia absurdum is more than just a stupidity, or a contradiction in terms. It looks perverse, but its point is not its perversity. There’s a story in Boccaccio’s Decameron of the Devil, having taken the form of a man, deciding to snatch the soul of a certain small-time rural priest whom, he knows, is having doubts about his faith. He arranges for the priest to visit Rome: ‘for,’ the devil thinks, ‘when he sees all the vanity and venality, the corruption and impurity of what is supposed to be the very centre of Christianity he will tumble into atheism!’ The priest, excited to see the Holy City, accepts the offer. He travels, sees the city and returns, but with his faith restored. ‘Wait a minute,’ says the devil. ‘What about the wickedness! The nepotism and lustfulness, the corruption and gluttony!’ ‘It is true I saw all that,’ the priest confirms. ‘But it made me realise: for Christianity to be able to encompass the whole world, and be as widespread and powerful as it is, even upon such rotten foundations — why then Christ must be stronger and more certain than I ever realised before!’ The devil is thwarted.

As an outsider I can confirm: it’s easy to look at religion and see only money-grubbing evangelical preachers, paedophile priests and jihadist fanatics. But, as a plain observation about the world, religion is — almost if not quite entirely — not that. It is two billion Christians and a billion Muslims and a billion other believers living their lives, getting on with things, their being-in-the-world structured by their faith. If such credunt is predicated upon absurdity, then the functional efficacy of the belief invites us to reconsider the kind of the absurdity we’re talking about. Voltaire said: ‘certainement qui est en droit de vous rendre absurde est en droit de vous rendre injuste’, a sentence poorly translated by the common English version: ‘those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities’ (rendre is not croire after all). The point is: most of the population of the globe believe in the absurdities of their faiths and almost none of them commit atrocities. Épater les bourgeois has its place, but épater les bulk-of-human-beings-alive veers towards the kind of intolerance that only edgelords and adolescents find beguiling. We should grow up. 1

Friday, 2 April 2021

Mitch Benn, "The Terra Trilogy" (2020-21)


The question of tone is perhaps underexplored in criticism and reviews. A book or film can be simplistically written, or clumsy, or can perpetrate various aesthetic delinquencies without alienating its readers if it hits the right tone. By the same token, a book can be admirably written and achieve interesting things and yet be tonally alienating to the point it is fundamentally unlovable. This latter describes, I sometimes fear, some of my own best books. But I was put in mind of the former reading Mitch Benn’s Terra trilogy. Not that Benn writes simplistically (although he pitches these books at younger readers, and avoids any more complicated stylistic fretwork, or indeed fireworks) or that the trilogy is clumsily rendered: it's not, it's well-plotted and cleverly handled. The register is classic SF through a comic lens, somewhat after the manner of Douglas Adams or Pratchett’s YA books. And the result is funny. Not roll around on the floor, lose-control-of-your-bladder hilarious, but certainly funny. My point is that, tonally, the whole thing possesses great charm, a thing that is perhaps surprisingly rather rare in SF. I enjoyed this trilogy very much.

In book 1, Terra, we follow the titular heroine, who was ‘rescued’ from Earth by a well-meaning alien called Lppb (he acted, even though doing so violating his species’ principle of non-interference, because he believed Terra’s parents to have died in a car crash leaving the baby alone). She has been brought up on the utopian planet of Fnrr. At 12-years-old she is about to start alien high school as the only human in class. Fnrr is nicely drawn: a rational, ordered if vowelless place full of Pulp SF wonder-tech, and Terra is a likeable protagonist. The story, such as it is, concerns malign forces readying for war. Terra has a key role to play in saving her adoptive world, bringing her unique human-ness to bear on the threat; and at the end she is reunited with her not-dead-after-all human parents. There’s a satirical edge here, about how shabbily we are treating our own irreplaceable planet, but Benn doesn’t press too insistently on that pedal.

Book 2, Terra’s Earth, picks up two years later, with Terra not particularly enjoying her time back on Earth (the question of where ‘fits in’, where she feels herself to be ‘at home’, runs through the whole trilogy). This instalment gives Terra a sidekick, a boy called Billy Dolphin, annoyed that the appearance of actual flying saucers in the skies of Earth has killed his beloved science fiction. Things are looking grim on planet Fnnr, though. For one thing, a dictator, who has acquired the human knack of lying, previously unknown on the world, has seized power (shades of Ricky Gervais The Invention of Lying here, although Benn handles the premise to make more of an anti-religion point). For another thing, a strange black featureless planet is hurtling in on a collision course. Terra and Billy save the day from the Borg-like giant ball of nanothreat.

In Book 3, Terra’s War, an anomaly called the Everywar is spreading, like ‘a crack in the sky’, across the cosmos. Through it emerge swarms of monster-alien attackers (‘big, quadrupedal, the four limbs seemed to operate as arms or legs as required, breathing a sort of oily black liquid,’ Terra notes. ‘We saw its thoughts, we felt its feelings. It was consumed with hatred for us. I’ve never felt anything so horrible’). There’s a broader canvas in this third instalment: the story takes the characters all over the shop, and is rather more violent than the previous two. There are different theories about the Everywar: an invasion, a kind of cosmic sickness, or perhaps a cosmic immune reaction (‘Yes, said the Kwad Shar Chen matter-of-factly. Perhaps our universe has become diseased, corrupted. Perhaps what we now observe is simply the immune system of the cosmos in operation: purging the infection so that the universe may ... heal’). The reality behind the Everywar is somewhat different, but I abjure spoilers.

Various strands from the first two books are picked up again; there’s a bit more religious satire (‘A doctrine of humility being preached from a church the size of a moon, thought Terra. If you say so ...’), a smidgeon of time-travel and a good deal of what the film classification geezers call ‘mild peril’. If the first volume was a trifle under-plotted, the next two volumes make-up for that: each, I'd say, is an improvement on the last. It seems fatuous to describe the trilogy as ‘proper’ SF—it is, but you might well prefer improper SF—but it’s readable, enjoyable, ingeniously plotted stuff, and, to return to my original point, genuinely charming. Also: in this vol, Benn coins a new word, ‘Propilogue’. I very much hope this will catch on. 

Sunday, 21 March 2021

The Snyder Cut




#DeReleaseTheSnyderCut  

Undo it. Have The Flash run faster than light to wind it back into the past.

It's a bad film, it's an egregious bad film. At every point it chooses pomposity over fun, the pose over meaning, the action-figure over character. It's tortoise-slow, sewage-coloured, masculinist (Wonder Woman diminished further from her earlier near-nothing) arthritic bollocks. It's a film that offers its central insight on a golden platter for the audience to admire: THE TEAM IS STRONGER THAN THE INDIVIDUAL. Only in as pathologically individualist a culture as the US could this pass for Great Wisdom.

Ben Affleck is a handsome bloke, and has assiduously beefed-up for this role. But his charismalessness is painful to watch. That man is natman batman. 

Henry Cavill's Cancelled Moustache would have been a better Superman.

The Flash is ... well: his fundamental conceit is just silly.

Wonder Woman was sidelined in the original Justice League flick but she did get a couple of sparky dialogue scenes. Not here. Now she's just a red leather corset and a short skirt.

Cyborg has a ploddingly set-up, allegedly poignant family context that is as unconvincing as it is dull.

Aquaman doesn't fit at all. His character belongs to a kitsch nonsense-fantasy of briny fish-prince royalty. In this film he's just a shirtless over-buffed dude holding a big fork who sometimes gets into a rumble.

The villains are sub-Panto. Steppenwolf is less born to be wild, more bored to be bad-guy, lurching around in a suit of armour made from a thousand metal strips that looks like John Lewis silvered wrapping paper. Darkseid is slightly taller than Steppenwolf and has glow-y eyes. The army of flying minions are about as scary as a bunch of daddy-long-legses.

In sum: it's a turd. Zack Snyder's Justice Log.

Sunday, 7 March 2021

Klara and the Spoilers


That's to say: it's hard to discuss this novel without giving away its ‘reveal’. Not that Ishiguro is an M. Night Shyamalan type of author, of course; we don't read him for his startling plot-twists. Perhaps spoilers don't matter. What he's doing in this novel doesn't depend upon his reveal, which ought to mean it would be possible to include spoilers in my discussion without actually spoiling the reading experience. Nevertheless, you probably don't want to read this review if you haven't read the novel. And you should read the novel! It's a good novel. Only ...  

And there you have it. Good, but. Start with the good. Ishiguro writes a certain kind of book. His is a dialled-down, even chilly manner. It's possible to bounce-off that (this, indeed, was my first reaction to reading him) but dismissing his fiction because it's not hotter, in a McLuhan-y sense, because it's not more melodramatically styled, or eventful, or gnashing, or because everyone is so on-the-surface polite, really is to miss the point of him. His books are about these important, sometimes eloquent repressions. About the way that, in both our love and our animosity, we understand less than we think we do. He thinks we are outsiders looking in. Or, more precisely, that though we are all outsiders looking in, there isn't really an ‘in’ to observe: there's no big central meaning, or mystery, that defines life, or if there is something ‘in’ there—if fascism is on the rise in 1930s Continental Europe, if there is an ongoing holocaust of cloned teeangers being murdered so as to harvest their organs, if there are ogres and dragons lurking in the mist—then such things are not at the centre of the stories Ishiguro tells, because such things are not, whatever we might tell ourselves, actually at the centre of our lives.

He writes about characters on the edge of things, quiescent figures navigating the small-scale difficulties of their world, who spend more time observing than acting, are more passive than active, patients rather than agents. This, Ishiguro is saying, is how things are, and this is the ground against which he makes his subtle, affecting etudes of sanity (in The Unconsoled), memory (in The Buried Giant) or innocence and hope (in this novel). If you don't like his books because they are not pungently-enough written, or because the characterisation isn't jolting-joe enough for you, that's your perogative. But you're missing an utterly distinctive, often moving and penetrating voice. Craig Raine says somewhere that dubeity and conviction are the twin poles of dreaming (he was talking about Kafka, I think) and there's a gleam along precisely that fault line with which Ishiguro at his best illuminates.

That's not to say that he's not sometimes a boring writer. On the contrary, he is often a boring writer. But dreams are often boring too (we can be honest) and there are truths, and effects, and indeed affects, that are only articulable via boredom. The point is that Ishiguro balances a relentless, sometimes tedious clarity of apperception—hence Klara as a name, here—with a kind of obliquity, an uncertitude, a haziness. An eloquent reticence. When it works, this balance manages things no other writer achieves; but that's not to say that Ishiguro's schtick (dismissive word, I know) is equally effective in each of his novels. I didn't love The Buried Giant for instance, and although I enjoyed the process of reading Klara and the Sun rather more than that previous novel I can't say that I think it entirely works, as a novel. It may be, as has been the case with other novels by him, I need to let it settle, to let its ironies and uncanninesses to steep for a while in my imagination. I don't know though. 

Klara is a robot, although nobody at any point in the story uses that word: her kind are ‘Artificial Friends’, or ‘AFs’. This, in a small way, is symptomatic of a larger problem. It's one of the tells of a less sfnally confident writer I think, a superstitious shying-away from the over-obvious, as when a story about vampires or zombies scrupulously avoids the v-word or the z-word and instead refers to ‘feeders’ or ‘walkers’ or whatever. Actually in real life we call our robots robots, because obviousness is part of who we are as a species. And (actually) it seems to me this trivial thing is an element of a larger two-fold problem with Ishiguro's robots. Which two folds? Well, one is the sheer derivativeness of the story he is telling here, a perennial problem for writers who work in SF. The other is about the way the robot figures, the semiotic of ‘the robot’ as such, and that's a bigger problem. [This, incidentally, is where the spoilers begin].

The first of these two folds is the more noticeable, especially to a reader who happens to have read widely in the SF backlist. Reading Klara and the Sun reminded me of reading a hundred pulp SF stories about robots, and although few of those were as elegantly written as this I wasn't sure Ishiguro adds all that much to this tradition. We start in a old-style shop that sells robots as companions, seen entirely from the perspective of Klara, one of the items of stock. She is a mild, charming and observant individual, possessed of (we are told) ‘wonderful mental capabilities’, although at the same time she is culpably naïve to the point of actual simple-mindedness.

Klara is bought as a companion to a clever but sickly girl called Josie who lives with her mother in an expensive house in the countryside. Josie's parents are separated, and her mother's high-flying job does not leave much time for Josie, who spends most of her days alone—hence, we suppose, the need for an artificial friend. There is a neighbouring house in which an English boy called Rick lives. Rick and Josie have declared their love for one another and are planning an adult life together, although Rick is poor where Josie is rich. From time to time Josie's mother takes her into the city so she can have her portrait painted. Josie had an older sister called Sal who died. For about half its length the novel bubbles along with all this, and the reader is borne along the bubbles. The mother, Chrissie, is nicely drawn (her love for her daughter complicated by her fear of losing her which leads to some sharp and even cruel treatment) and both Klara and Rick feel like teenagers, or so I thought.

Then the twist: Josie is not just sickly, she is dying. The portrait Chrissie has commissioned is not a painting but a looky-likey robot body. Klara has been purchased not as a companion for Josie but in order to observe her closely enough to be able to mimic her, such that after her death Klara's programme can be transferred into this Josie-robot and Chrissie can assuage her grief by continuing to live with a simulacrum of her daughter.

It is, in other words, a retread of Aldiss's story ‘Super Toys Last All Summer Long’ (made into the much baggier 2001 Spielberg movie A.I.), via about a dozen Asimov robot stories (slogan: “I, Robot: the ‘I’ stands for Ishiguro!”) and a standard Black Mirror plotline. The stiffly formal politesse with which Ishiguro's robots talk is part of this pulp tradition too: I was somewhat reminded of another Aldiss story, 1958's ‘Who Can Replace a Man?’, which does much of the work of Klara and the Sun, only funnier and in ten pages rather than 300.

This twist is shadowed by Klara's own leap of robo-faith. She herself is solar powered, and needs only to sit in the sun for a short time to be recharged. From the display window of the store, before she is bought, she sees a tramp die (as she thinks) in the shadows of the alleyway opposite. The next day the tramp is up and about again and she deduces that the sun has restored him, just as it does her. When she realises that Jodie is dying she strikes a bargain with the sun: in return for a small sacrifice on her part (specifically, sabotaging a polluting city truck, since she believes the sun hates pollution) let the sun cure Josie of her sickness. This episode and its consequences are at the heart of the novel, and include some very striking and beautiful writing. If Klara's mission feels a little arbitrary, then faith sometimes manifests that way: like Gorchakov struggling repeatedly to cross the swimming pool without extinguishing the candle he is carrying in Tarkovsky's Nostalghia.       

This, though, brings me to the second and bigger problem. It's not that Klara's hopeless prayers to the sun-god aren't affecting, because they are. And the ambiguous ending of the novel, where it seems a miracle cure has indeed been effected, doesn't diminish this (indeed, the final chapter, in which Klara, still as ingenuously curious and observant as ever, seems to have been abandoned in a junk-yard of some kind is beautiful and touchingly done). But Klara herself is a bad robot. Not morally bad, or badly written, but badly conceived. Bad in the sense that she has to be two absolutely incompatible things for the story to work. She has to be both an amazingly complex machine whose chips and programming pass the Turing Test and actualise genuine personhood, a technological marvel capable of superhuman processing feats—and she has to be the village fucking idiot, who observes human beings eating and drinking and still thinks they are somehow solar-powered, who thinks bulls rise up out of the ground into their fields and who believes that the sun literally lives in a half-built barn visible from Josie's house. I don't mean to taunt Ishiguro with failing to satisfy a hobgoblin-of-little-minds consistency with this. This second, foolish Klara is really the point of the novel. It's is a book about innocence, and the selfless love and profound hope such innocence enables; and Ishiguro has a sensitive and (I think) true apperception of the ways innocence and ignorance blur one into the other. But ‘the robot’ is the wrong figure for this Prince-Myshkinosity.

Let me put it this way: there is an old-fashioned vibe to Klara and the Sun. The near-future America Ishiguro describes smacks of the 1950s. That's not a problem in itself (the same could be said about Phil Dick's best work) except in one regard. Ishiguro has observed that teenagers spend all their time on their phones, a detail reproduced in this novel. But Klara herself is entirely cut-off from the world wide web. Her programming is sophisticated enough to enable her to mimic human behaviour and speech precisely, but her programmers didn't think to fit her with a database explaining how the world works on the most basic level, such that she might understand that the sun is a giant ball of nuclear-scalding gas in space and not an orange deity that lives in a barn. Ishiguro groks that teens are online all the time, but he hasn't grokked the Internet of Things.

My objection is not a worldbuilding one (although, I have to say: of course a robot like Klara would be connected to the internet). I can see that a Klara with access to even the most basic information about how the world works wouldn't be a Klara who would trek to a barn to offer a sacrifical deal to the Sun that lives there. If Ishiguro's solution to this is a bodge, well alright, sometimes writers must bodge. No: my objection is that ‘the robot’ just doesn't figure what Ishiguro needs it to figure for Klara and the Sun to work. He is a writer fascinated by outsiders, by individuals who combine unusual observational insight with a kind of blindness to looming obviousnesses. He returns again and again to the disengaged and disenfranchised in order to construe a vision of life in terms of disengagement and disenfranchisement. In the English servant class of the 1930s of Remains of the Day, or in the clones of Never Let Me Go, or even in the very elderly, alzheimery couple of The Buried Giant he selects viable vehicles with which to explore and dramatise this fascination. But robots don't work that way. The thing about contemporary technology is not that it stands outside human life, watching with loving but slightly baffled innocence; it's that it absolutely interpenetrates our lives. That it is the pharmakon that simultaneously enables and poisons all our intrapersonal connections. The technology of which ‘the robot’ is the fictive avatar, the technology that manifests in our actual lives in all the ways it does (from Alexa and Roombas to our ever-present phones and screens, from the agorithms that steer us about the internet to the hundreds of labour-saving automated systems in our homes) just isn't the coolly disengaged observer that Ishiguro, in this novel, needs it to be. 

There are a couple of other, less central but clumsy false steps in the book too, I think. I mean, pity the editor tasked with returning constructive criticism on the new manuscript by their publishing house's only Nobel Laureate: can't be easy. Still: Josie's father, separated from her mother, joins them in the latter third of the novel for a trip into town, and we discover that the breakdown of the marriage was a function of him leaving his high-prestige job and joining a group of fascists. This far-right political strand, though, is undeveloped, and hangs awkwardly. Perhaps Ishiguro introduced it because he felt, having premised his book on intelligent robots, he had to run a line about slavery (because, you see, intelligent robots would be slaves, do you see? do you?) alongside the novel's major themes of innocence and hope. Klara and the Sun is set in a sketchily-rendered future America, and it can't be denied that the heritage of slavery is still a major, malign shaping force in American politics.

The problem is that Ishiguro isn't really interested in politics—another underdeveloped strand in the novel is that some kids have been genetically altered to be smarter and some haven't, although none of the societal or even existential implications of this are developed—and his treatment of race is awkward to the point of being actively problematic. So it is that Klara, a robot and therefore by definition neither white nor black, notices the skin-colour of the humans she observes, but only when that colour is black: ‘a black-skinned woman stepped forward’ [68] ‘I saw the Diner Manager, a large, black-skinned man, standing very still behind [the counter]’ [245] and so on. So it is that Josie's mum has a bossy housekeeper called, ahem, Melania, who speaks like this: ‘“Listen A.F. Ma'am take Miss Josie to see Mr Capaldi. Portrait guy. That Mr Capaldi is one creep son bitch ... Ma'am love Miss Josie. But Miss Sal die and mess Ma'am up bad. Get me, A.F.?”’ [177]. Like the cook in old Tom and Jerry cartoons we never see her face, and she remains entirely marginal. If I say Klara and the Sun just doesn't get race in contemporary America right, you might counter with: well, it's not really a novel about race. Perhaps so; but in that case it would probably have been better for Ishiguro to have left out these half-done gestures.

It also seemed to me that the novel is too long, and too slow. That's a trickier call, since overlong, repetitive and slow has been part of the Ishiguro USP since at least The Unconsoled. The difference, though, is that elongation, repetition and a morass of triviality (as evasion) is the point of The Unconsoled, where it doesn't strike me as the point of this novel. 

In sum: despite some wonderful portions, this seems to me a near-miss from Ish. But perhaps I'll change my mind on it. I've done so before on Ishiguro's writing.

Monday, 25 January 2021

On Silence and Judgement

 



:1:

I don't propose to enter into a detailed response, in this blogpost, to DeLillo's latest. Or to be more precise, I'm interested in my broader reaction to DeLillo's latest rather than the more detailed specifics of such reaction. 

The Silence is brief. It's padded-out in my edition with large font (in, irksomely enough, typewriter case throughout, like a typescript from 1960) to 116 pages, but the whole is well under 20,000 words. It opens inside a plane on its way from Paris to New York. One passenger, Jim, is coping with his anxiety by reading the numbers off the in-flight screen: ‘arrival time sixteen thirty-two. Speed four seventy-one m.p.h. Time to destination three thirty-four’ and so on. His wife Tessa, a poet, is jotting things in her notebook. DeLillo describes her with an awkwardly egregious emphasis on pigmenation: ‘dark-skinned, Tessa Berens’; ‘Caribbean-European-Asian origins’ and the like. Then, later in the novel, when Jim and Tessa have made their way to Diane Lucas' Manhattan appartment, we get: ‘Diana thought she was beautiful, mixed-parentage’ [71]. Diane is a retired university professor and is hosting a Super Bowl party with her husband Max and a younger friend Martin (this latter one Diane's former students; he seems to be on the autism spectrum). The skin-colour of these other characters is not vouchsafed to us, but we can intuit the blanke default, alas (at one point, inside the appartment, DeLillo peers into Tessa's mind and shares what, we assume, he assumes a woman like her would be thinking: ‘she sees herself. She is different from these people. She imagines taking off her clothes nonerotically to show them who she is’ [91]. And then again, later: ‘Tessa Berens studies the backs of her hands as if confirming the color, her color’ [112]. Hmm.)

Anyway: Jim and Tessa's plane suffers engine failure and lands bumpily, leaving Jim with a wound where his head knocked against the window. In Manhattan, Diane, Max and Martin talk sport, types of bourbon, telescopes, life, the universe and Einstein’s 1912 Manuscript on the Special Theory of Relativity which Martin quotes at length from memory, in English and German, sometimes affecting an Albert Einstein voice. 

The big event of the novel happens: electricity dies, the grid has failed, all the screens go black. It's a temporary inconvenience, or it's a permanent collapse, the novel doesn't tell us. Jim and Tessa make their way to a NY hospital where Jim's head is bandaged. The two of them have sex in a toilet cubicle before walking across town to Diane's appartment. There they join the others in disposing of the time with chatty chatting chat. Max performs an imaginary commentary of what might be happening at the Super Bowl. More Einstein is quoted. Ponderings on the nature of reality alternate with banalities. The book ends by giving each of the main characters a two-page-long monologue: Diane talks about ‘staring into space’ and ‘time's arrow’; Jim recounts their emergency landing (‘I was tossed sideways into the window, someone was shouting fire, was a wing on fire’); Max recalls walking around the now darkened city; Tessa speculates on apocalypse (‘is our normal experience being stilled? Are we witnessing a deviation in nature itself?’) and finally Martin quotes some more Einsein. Bish bash and, dare I say it, bosh: the novel is done.

This is a slight piece of work, or it isn't; a five-finger exercise or a brilliant distillation. There are, I think, interesting, or potentially interesting, things going on. It's a novel about end zones, end times (like lots of DeLillo) and about words. It's about words in the sense that there's very little descriptive prose; it's almost entirely dialogue—it reads, indeed, as if DeLillo had originally conceived it as a play, and only latterly decided to novelise his material—and therefore about that John Ashbery thang of threading profundity and beauty through the quotidian murmurs and gabble of ordinary speech. But it's also about words in a more quasi-religious, lapsed-Catholic logos sense: ‘“Cryptocurrencies ... Crypto” [Diane] says, pausing, keeping her eyes on Martin. “Currencies.” Somewhere within all those syllables, something secret, covert, intimate’ [86]. Lest we miss this, DeLillo repeatedly presses the relevant pedal:
“The painted ceilings. Rome,” she said. “The tourists looking up.”

“Standing absoluely still.”

“Saints and angels. Jesus of Nazareth.”

“The luminous figure. The Nazarene. Einstein,” he said. [53]
There's also lots in the novel to do with screens. Airborne Jim reading his screen for comfort. Everyone on their phones all the time, as everyone is nowadays. Folk gathered to watch not the Super Bowl (as DeLillo's characters gather to watch the baseball at the beginning of Underworld) but to watch a screen-mediated version of the Super Bowl. Screens, DeLillo knows, grant us only a kind of simulacrum of access to things and people, but screens also screen us from things and people, protect us. That, combined with the gestured-towards (lazily gestured-towards would be an overly judgmental way of putting it, but still) consilience of Einstein's weird physics and religious faith, is the main thrust of this book.

Alright. But, as I said at the beginning, I'm not here to delve into all that. Rather I'm intrigued by the fact that, upon finishing the novel I could not decide whether it was any good or not. This is what I tweeted at that time:



Consider: I am a professional critic. Determining and assessing literary and aesthetic judgment is literally what I do for a living. You'd think I'd be able to thumbs-up or thumbs-down a 20,000 word novella. And yet here we are.

I don't mean to protest too much, of course. I could certainly gussy-up a reaction, if pressed (or, as it might be, paid: for instance paid to write a review of the title). That's not my point. Rather I'm intrigued by the Schrödinger's felinity of this particular novel. Aren't our aesthetic responses more intuitive and immediate than this? If I drink a slug of milk I know immediately whether it's gone off or not. If I hear a song for the first time I can, by and large, tell whether I like it, or at the very least whether I'm going to like it, as (if) I become more famliar with it. DeLillo, increasingly (which is to say with a lot of his later, post 9/11 fiction), leaves me baffled on this front. I don't mean baffled with respect to what the novel's about, what he's doing and so on. Baffled on this fundamental level of not knowing whether his novel is good or is shit. Honestly, The Silence could be either.

My milk analogy isn't entirely apropos, I know. Kant's Critique of Judgement distinguishes between four modes of aesthetic response: agreeable / disagreeable; good / bad; beautiful / ugly; sublime / contemptible. The agreeable is a simple sensory judgment (it gives immediate sensory pleasure; ‘this doughnut tastes nice’, ‘this bed is soft’ and so on). The good is a moral judgment, and so connected to Kant's idea of a fixed and absolute notion of ethical reason. The beautiful is a ‘subjective universal’ judgment, one that relies on what Kant calls the ‘free play’ of the cognitive powers of imagination and understanding, and which he argues must broadly conform with the sorts of judgements (‘this is beautiful’, ‘this is ugly’) of other reasonable and cultured people, a sensus communis as to the criteria of taste by which such judgments can be made. The sublime is also a ‘subjective universal’, with the difference that it speaks not to proportion, harmony etc, but to a going-beyond the immediately comprehensible, an awe-inspiring affect of terror and wonder.

We're going beyond agreeability into quesions of taste, and taste, obviously, is taught rather than innate (judging a Haydn string quartet or a Rothko canvas is hardly an instinctual ability possessed by every newborn, after all). As a little kid I liked the bright, accessible music of Beatles but hated Bob Dylan's tuneless droning and wheezy soundworld. I later learned to love Dylan, and to see the aesthetic merit and resonance where before I heard only ugliness. Sometimes I engage with art and, as the phrase goes, bounce off it. Often I will give the art another go: for maybe the problem is me. Maybe I can learn to love it. And sometimes I do so! Often I don't. Of course I don't expect my aesthetic response to be always and everywhere instant and infallible. But ... I've been kicking around, aesthetic-judgment-wise, long enough (as per Malcolm Gladwell's Blink) for it often to be instant, and rarely wrong. In this case, though, my gut is caught, like a donkey between two equidistant and equally tempting bales of straw, who then starves to death, between good and bad as DeLillo judgments. Odd, no?

Perhaps the conclusion we should draw, here, is that DeLillo is unusually good at pitching his novels into an uncanny zone where good writing and bad writing are in weird superposition. I don't know though. I wonder, instead, whether there has been a shift in the sensus communis, in terms of the legitimacy of aesthetic judgment. Experimental art of the postwar period, especially through the 1960s and 1970s (more so I think than the earlier generation of High Modernism) foregrounded a range of artworks which invited the reaction ‘is this crap?’ (rather than, as it might be, ‘is this good according to a different set of aesthetic criteria to the ones with which I am familiar?’) Les Demoiselles d'Avignon set out to be shocking and deracinating of reaction, but in a different way to, let's say, Carl Andre's neatly rectangular arrangement of bricks, Equivalent VIII (‘120 firebricks arranged in a rectangular formation,’ say the Tate website: ‘an important Minimalist work [that] provoked uproar after a 15 February 1976 article appeared in The Sunday Times questioning both the work's artistic merit and the price paid by the Tate in acquiring the artwork’). I'm old enough to remember the furore over the Tate's ‘Bricks’, as the work became known. The thing that occurs to me is that most of this kerfuffle was socially performative. Some of it was reflex anti-intellectualism, a suspicion of ‘high culture’ tout court, ‘I don't know much about art but I know what I like’ and so on (‘Emperor's New Clothes!’ scornfulness and all that). Some of it was genuine confusion, perhaps from people who had assiduously acquired a quasi-Kantian canon of tastes in art, only now to feel they were being sneered at by artists telling them: that's all been superseded now. Some of it was partisan on the other side: ‘if it upsets the establishment and traditionalists then it is good’ etc. None of this, it seems to me, touches the fundamental reflex of response: is Equivalent VIII good art, because it embodies balance, harmony, poise etc but makes these things new within a challenging intellectual-conceptual framework? Or is it shit, because it's just a fucking stack of breeze blocks some shyster has managed to fob off on one of the world's great art galleries. Mutatis mutandis, is The Silence column A, here, or column B?

The point (it's an obvious point, I know) is that these are less textual than they are metatextual engagements; discussions less about the specifics of this one artwork and more about the parameters of art as such. Which, though perfectly valid and interesting as a debate, is not what this blogpost is about. I have no issue with the posmodern novel, or obliquity in novel-making, or evem DeLillo, many of whose novels—earlier novels, if I'm honest, but still—I hold in high regard. This blogpost, though, is about this one novel, and its shitness or otherwise. Alright?   



:2:

Samuel Johnson once said ‘No man is a hypocrite in his pleasures.’ This may be the most wrongheaded thing Johnson ever said. I used to think it was, perhaps, only half-wrongheaded: that a man might, as it were, find hypocritical pleasure in Wagner in public, for the benefit of those he hoped to impress, and thereby for his own benefit, though he would still go home to his solitary domicile and his Easy Listening CDs. In other words I used to think that taste is, in large part defined by the movement from ego to Other and that it therefore necessarily encompasses both. But things are, I think, more complex than that. After all, we all of us often construe ‘pleasure’ when what we're actually experiencing is that-which-we-feel-we-ought-to-enjoy, or the pleasure of others we wish in turn to please, or perhaps to become like. We are social beings and therefore, as Freud notes in his Civilisation and Its Discontents, inexorably hypocritical. Our pleasures lie along precisely the same lines of force, even when, or perhaps especially when, we tell ourselves that they are our private business. Guilty pleasure is the horizon of pleasure of such, perhaps.

In part this reflects the fact that we can only gauge what our pleasures are by apprehending other peoples’ pleasures. The pleasure of others, for the various ways we construe that term ‘pleasure’, determines and shapes our pleasure. We sexually desire those who shape our sexual desire. We admire the art that is admirable by the standards of others (‘I don’t know much about art, but I know what others like …’). There aren’t any other standards for us to apply, after all. In the sense that we all own enjoyments that are not actually ours, we are nothing but hypocrites in our pleasures.

Johnson also said ‘he who makes a beast of himself gets rid of the pain of being a man’ Thus the drunk, the crack-addict, the lecher and the sadist are all hoping for solace in their beastly life-projects. But these passtimes are quite alien to beasts (a lecherous beast? A drunk beast? A sadistic beast?). To say this is not to assert any animal-lib moral superiority of beasts over people; quite the reverse. It’s not that beasts are incapable of selfish self-indulgence: patently, they are – there’s nothing so gluttonous as a pampered dog. Rather it is to say that to live as a beast is to inhabit their moment-to-moment immersion in mortality, and that’s precisely where the pain of being a man inheres. Beasts do not need to rid themselves of the pain of being beasts because that’s not the shape of beastly consciousness; but men who method-act beastiality can never do other than throw into horrible relief their own self-conscious humanity. If you live moment by moment then death is only ever a moment away. It's that moment-ness that narcotics and fantasy are there to obscure.

Friday, 15 January 2021

On Pastoral




:1:

We put culture on one side, bracketing with it society, architecture, religion, art and so on; and we put nature way over the other side, there. Nature doesn't make culture. Or so we think. We make culture. Of course, nature makes us first (inevitably we are, in one sense, a product of nature). But once nature has made us we go on to make another thing, which I'm here calling culture. That two-step is essential to the form of distinction being made; and its doubleness is the structure of pastoral.

Of course it's wrongheaded, as assertions go. We could put it this way: does nature have culture? Nature may manifest society, or something close to it: the pack of dogs, the beehive. But does the beehive have culture? When the bees do their little dance, is that art? We're tempted to say no because the dance of bees is functional, and because we assume bees don't reflect upon the dance as dance. That self-reflection is needful for a performance to be art, presumably. But, really, how can we possibly know? What the bee-dance says to me is that our grasp of the natural world is defined, indeed is constituted, by a kind of existential paucity. It is what we cannot apprehend as culture that is the core of nature. In The Beast in the Nursery Adam Phillips says: 'we prefer the barbarity of culture to the barbarity of nature even though we usually can't tell them apart.' He adds a rather neat after-all: 'there is nothing more cultured than our fantasies about nature' [26]. True, that.

Nature is always the resource that has always already been worked. The landscape is not 'nature'; it is what cultivation has made of the natural resource. Nature is worked, and therefore Pastoral is always reworked—practically speaking, an eclogue is always a reworking of Hughes as a reworking of Wordsworth as a reworking of Vergil as a reworking of Theocritus. Pastoral is a kind of blockchain, and in a more acute and formally self-reflexive sense than the standard 'intertextuality' argument, that insists all literature is a kind of blockchain.

Pastoral as escape, means: there is a benchmark existence from which escape looks both desirable and possible. This rather simplistic explanation, though, leads us into to some surprisingly complex and relevant places. At the risk of over-simplification, we might say: start from a position when life is hard, relentless—when life is work, and life is urban, is scarcity and frustration—then fantasy becomes: ease, unobstruction, leisure, rural, abundant and satisfaction. This is the pastoral of Theocritus and Vergil and Spenser, the classic understanding of the locus amoenus. But something happens to pastoral in the eighteenth- and early-nineteenth centuries that rewires this, we can be honest, rather simplistic understanding. (What's facile about it is the way it contains its own contradiction: a life that is all holiday is no holiday at all, since there's no benchmark of tedium and stress from which to escape, and it is the release, not the merely sensual pleasure, that is the key thing). The modification of pastoral entailed a two-step: first Goldsmith's Deserted Village (1770) and Crabbe's The Village (1783) described rural life as hard, draining, frustrating and poor (as indeed it largely is) whilst insisting that once upon a time it had been golden, Arcadian. That is to say, they, and other poets from around this time doing similar things with the pastoral mode, such as John Struthers, Clare and Balfour, were engaged in relocated the nature of Arcadia from being a different place to being a different (past) time. Instead of being defined as a (good) place distinct from the (bad) city or court, it becomes a good (past) time distinct from the bad present. That in turn connects with a longer tradition of 'past Golden Age' mythology. The fit, there, is so precise that pastoral itself can become seen as an mode of nostalgia, or more precisely as the faux-nostalgia of yearning for a time you never yourself actually experienced.

That's not right, though; because, after Vergil, the most important intervention into the pastoral tradition is Wordsworth's poetic creation of 'Nature' as a ground of transcendental aesthetic and ontological value—and that flows directly from the eighteenth-century traditions of Goldsmithian or Crabbean 'anti-pastoral'. I could devote a long passage to establishing this, but this blog-post is shaping up to be long enough already, so I'm going to ask you to take it on trust. You might trust less my insistence that it is from this new thing—I mean, from Wordsworth's new version of 'Nature'—that much of the force and a surprising number of the specifics of modern-day environmentalism as ethos and aesthetic derive. It's true. I mean, I don't want to overstate the influence; although, actually, its hard to overstate the way the 19th-century's most influential English-language poet shaped a whole culture, and the ways in which the later 20th-century Green movements, in reacting against the machinism of early 20th-century Modernist and Popular cultures, inevitably reached back to something always-already Wordsworthian in their revalorisation of natural spaces.

Wordsworth is the second footprint in the 'two-step' I mentioned above. From pastoral as a pleasant Arcadian other place we stride, first, to pastoral as a pleasant Arcadian past-time, to which the anti-pastoral of contemporary rural suffering is contrasted; and second, we move to pastoral as a mode of transcendence grounded in contemporary rural suffering. Wordsworth's Michael (the hero of what the 1815 printing calls 'A Pastoral Poem') has grown very old in a life of ceaseless labour, physical restriction and hardship. But because it has always been a life in Nature, it has been an authentic existential experience of the kind unavailable equally to those to live in the town or the past:
So lived he till his eightieth year was past.
And grossly that man errs, who should suppose
That the green Valleys, and the Streams and Rocks
Were things indifferent to the Shepherd's thoughts.
Fields, where with cheerful spirits he had breathed
The common air; the hills, which he so oft
Had climbed with vigorous steps; which had impressed
So many incidents upon his mind
Of hardship, skill or courage, joy or fear;
Which like a book preserved the memory
Of the dumb animals, whom he had saved,
Had fed or sheltered, linking to such acts,
So grateful in themselves, the certainty
Of honorable gains; these fields, these hills,
Which were his living Being, even more
Than his own blood—what could they less? had laid
Strong hold on his affections, were to him
A pleasurable feeling of blind love,
The pleasure which there is in life itself. [Wordsworth, 'Michael', 61-77]
His son Luke goes into the town, and is instantly lost. Only by staying in the country can Michael stay strong, even to his death in his late 80s. Something similar is true of all of Wordsworth's rural poor: the Leech Gatherer, Cumberland beggar, even the mad woman in 'The Thorn'. Nature homes them, in a profound ur-Heideggerian sense, and that fact reconfigures the force of pastoral itself. To cut what could become an over-lengthy excursion short, I'll sketch a line straight from Wordsworth's natural world to the late-20th-century pastoral of Hughes's Moortown poems (1979).



Not, as I say, wanting to labour the point, I'll point only to Moortown's 'Tractor' (it's one of my favourites amongst the whole capacious oeuvre of Hughes, actually) as one place where the pleasant sunny Arcadian wish-fulfillment of pastoral has come all the cold, hard way around to bite its own tail.
The tractor stands frozen—an agony
To think of. All night
Snow packed its open entrails. Now a head-pincering gale,
A spill of molten ice, smoking snow,
Pours into its steel.
At white heat of numbness it stands
In the aimed hosing of ground-level fieriness.

It defied flesh and won't start.
Hands are like wounds already
Inside armour gloves, and feet are unbelievable
As if the toe-nails were all just torn off.
I stare at it in hatred. Beyond it
The copse hisses—capitulates miserably
In the fleeing, failing light. Starlings,
A dirtier sleetier snow, blow smokily, unendingly, over
Towards plantations Eastward.
All the time the tractor is sinking
Through the degrees, deepening
Into its hell of ice.

The starting lever
Cracks its action, like a snapping knuckle.
The battery is alive—but like a lamb
Trying to nudge its solid-frozen mother—
While the seat claims my buttock-bones, bites
With the space-cold of earth, which it has joined
In one solid lump.

I squirt commercial sure-fire
Down the black throat—it just coughs.
It ridicules me—a trap of iron stupidity
I've stepped into. I drive the battery
As if I were hammering and hammering
The frozen arrangement to pieces with a hammer
And it jabbers laughing pain-crying mockingly
Into happy life.

And stands
Shuddering itself full of heat, seeming to enlarge slowly
Like a demon demonstrating
A more-than-usually-complete materialization—
Suddenly it jerks from its solidarity
With the concrete, and lurches towards a stanchion
Bursting with superhuman well-being and abandon
Shouting Where Where?

Worse iron is waiting. Power-lift kneels
Levers awake imprisoned deadweight,
Shackle-pins bedded in cast-iron cow-shit.
The blind and vibrating condemned obedience
Of iron to the cruelty of iron,
Wheels screeched out of their night-locks—

Fingers
Among the tormented
Tonnage and burning of iron

Eyes
Weeping in the wind of chloroform

And the tractor, streaming with sweat,
Raging and trembling and rejoicing. [16 February 1975]
What's particularly nice about this is the way Hughes's uses a machine as a means of focusing the existential authenticity of post-Wordwsorthian pastoral. It's the right machine, of course; since modern farming could hardly happen without tractors. But still, there's a near-miraculous metamorphosis in the poem, in which an artefact of culture becomes, without slipping into any foolish pathetic fallacy, nature itself. Becomes, we might say, the objective correlative of Michael's persistence, strength and labour. Out of hardship is generated beauty (for surely we can agree this is a very beautiful poem).

I don't know if there's a larger context here, which tracks the increasing pleasantness of general human existence (the case that Pinker makes, and which I suppose persuades me) against an increasing valorisation of hardship as such. If one's life is actually hard, one is less likely to enjoy the artistic re-presentation of that hardship back upon yourself. The starving human finds no pleasure in contemplating going on a diet. If your life is basically comfortable, and your sufferings inward rather than outward, then hardship acquires greater appeal. I don't know: there may be a parallel with politics. When real life is living with an empty belly four days out of every seven, is being cold day after day and dying in your thirties, you'll follow the leader who promises to make your life easy. When seven days are defined by fourteen square meals, and your home is heated and you're staring down the barrel of 70-years-plus, the apparent perversity of valorising hardship makes more sense, and you follow the leader who says he has nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat. I don't know.


:2:

This leads me to think again about Empson, the critic, whose writing on pastoral strikes me as some of the best there's ever been. Indeed, some Empsonian ideas, for example that the mere representation of rural pleasure is boring, elaborated at length in Some Versions of Pastoral are actually already present in Seven Types of Amibguity:
It is this (in some sense conscious) clash between different modes of feeling which is the normal source of pleasure in pastoral; or, at any rate, in so far as pastorals fail to produce it, one may agree with Johnson and call them a bore.
Thou shalt eat crudded cream
All the year lasting,
And drink the crystal stream
Pleasant in tasting;
Whig and whey whilst thou lust
And brambleberries,
Pie-lids and pastry-crust,
Pears, plums, and cherries. (ANON., Oxford Book.)
The delicacy of versification here (alliteration, balance of rhythm, and so forth) suggests both the scholar's trained apprehension and the courtier's experience of luxury; but it is of the brambleberry that he is an epicure; the subject forces into contact with these the direct gusto of a "swain." That all these good qualities should be brought together is a normal part of a good poem; indeed, it is a main part of the value of a poem, because they are so hard to bring together in life. But such a case as this is peculiar, because one is made to think of the different people separately; one cannot pretend to oneself that the author is the rustic he is impersonating; there is an element of wit in the first conception of the style. (Seven Types, 114-15)
This formal relation between 'simple' and 'complex' ('putting the complex in the simple', the closest thing in Some Types of Pastoral to a nutshell-definition of pastoral itself, is actually a slogan for all art, as Empson himself knows) stitches form to social relations. Pastoral not only represents but also embodies and therefore enables, a coming-together of poor-simples and rich-sophisticateds.
The essential trick of the old pastoral, which was felt to imply a beautiful relation between rich and poor, was to make simple people express strong feelings (felt as the most universal subject, something fundamentally true about everybody) in learned and fashionable language .... The effect was in some degree to combine in the reader or author the merits of the two sorts; he was made to mirror in himself more completely the effective elements of the society he lived in. This was not a process that you could explain in the course of writing pastoral; it was already shown by the clash between style and theme, and to make the clash work in the right way (not become funny) the writer must keep up a firm pretense that he was unconscious of it. [Some Versions, 11-12]
According to George Watson [The Literary Critics (Hogarth 1986), 184] 'Empson later insisted that his Marxism in the thirties and after—at least until the Communist revolution in China in 1949, which he witnessed—was more serious than his writings reveal, and Some Versions assumed the class analysis of society and the ideal status of the "proletariat".' This is not untrue, although the point for Empson, at least in this book, is always to bring the potential for social harmony back into the orientations of individual subjectivity. René Wellek [A History of Modern Criticism 1750-1950: V English Criticism 1900-1950 (Yale 1986), 280] puts forward a slightly more reductive reading.
[The book's] subject is the collapse of the pastoral relation between the swain-hero and the sheep people. It is again the theme of the loss of community, of the presumed original unity which underlies Eliot's concept of history. Pastoral is used in a very wide sense: thus the first chapter discusses proletarian literature which Empson considers a covert pastoral. But even proletarian literature is used in a much wider sense than the usual one ... Proletarian art is pastoral. The old pastoral implied "a beautiful relation between rich and poor" [11] but this relation has broken down, and the old pastoral had been replaced by the mock pastoral, the comic variety at first. Both versions, straight and comic, are based on a double attitude of the artist to the worker ("I am in one way better, in another not so good"), and this may well recognize a permanent truth about the aesthetic situation. "To produce pure proletarian art the artist must be one with the worker; this is impossible, not for political reasons, but because the artist never is at one with any public." [15]
Wellek might have added, though he doesn't, that this is a peculiarly Romantic version of 'the artist', which itself problematises the case being made (something of which Empson himself was aware: 'Mob thought may kill us all before our time, but the scientist's view of it should not be warped by horror, and the writer who isolates himself from all feeling for his audience acquires the faults of romanticism without its virtues.'). Actually, the implied individualism of all this is central to what Empson is arguing: not that the poet is alienated from society, but precisely that the (simple) poet holds within him/herself the (complex) of society. Here's Paul Alpers:
Marvell and Milton represent for Empson a withdrawal-to quote the verses that prompt the essay on "The Garden"-of the mind into its own happiness. The strengths of the "old pastoral" are most fully manifest in Elizabethan works, particularly the dramas, which are discussed in the chapter on "Double Plots." The Elizabethan double plot is a version of pastoral, because it is a convention-the strongest and most capacious, it would seem, in all our literature-for the stable presentation of conflicts and contradictions and for putting the complexities of life into the "simple" effects of art. [112]
To quote the man himself: 'in pastoral you take a limited life and pretend it is the full and normal one, and a suggestion that one must do this with all life, because the normal is itself limited, is easily put into the trick though not necessary to its power' [Some Versions of Pastoral, 114]. The element that's missing here is the way that paucity, and poverty, can become precisely the focus for strength in this reading of Nature. After all, Nature is so much bigger than we are. The really Arcadian thing in the natural world is that we have survived this far, at all. To switch back to Hughes it's the superbly insouciant potency of Crow's 'Me, evidently', from the close of 'Examination at the Womb-Door', another key late 20th-century pastoral work:
Who owns those scrawny little feet?      Death.
Who owns this bristly scorched-looking face?     Death.
Who owns these still-working lungs?       Death.
Who owns this utility coat of muscles?       Death.
Who owns these unspeakable guts?       Death.
Who owns these questionable brains?       Death.
All this messy blood?       Death.
These minimum-efficiency eyes?       Death.
This wicked little tongue?       Death.
This occasional wakefulness?       Death.

Given, stolen, or held pending trial?
Held.

Who owns the whole rainy, stony earth?       Death.
Who owns all of space?       Death.

Who is stronger than hope?        Death.
Who is stronger than the will?         Death.
Stronger than love?       Death.
Stronger than life?        Death.

But who is stronger than Death?

Me, evidently.

Pass, Crow.
It probably speaks to a continuing adolescence in my aesthetic sense, but by thunder I love that poem.