Tuesday, 14 March 2023

Zodiacal Alice

 


[from Lewis Carroll, Symbolic Logic (1896)]



We know Carroll loved games, puns, diversions and cleverness of all kinds: the Alice books are shot through with these things, wordplay, equivalences, ludic strategems and patterns. And there has certainly been no shortage of critical and fannish interpretations of the books. So it's surprising to me that nobody has made the following suggestion: Alice in Wonderland is a zodiacal book, and Through the Looking-Glass is a gloss upon its zodiacal logic.

The zodiac consists of twelve stations or zones (Aries, Taurus, Gemini, Cancer, Leo, Virgo, Libra, Scorpio, Sagittarius, Capricorn, Aquarius, and Pisces) that comprise eight animals—fish, ram, bull, scorpion, lion, crab, centaur and goat—and four other things: ‘water’, twins, the virgin and the scales of justice. The twelve chapters of the first Alice book are disposed between eight predominant animals and four other qualities (in what follows I notate the animals in lower case and the other qualities in capital letters):
I. Down the Rabbit-Hole [rabbit]
II. The Pool of Tears [WATER]
III. A Caucus-Race and a Long Tale [mouse]
IV. The Rabbit Sends in a Little Bill [lizard]
V. Advice from a Caterpillar [caterpillar]
VI. Pig and Pepper [pig]
VII. A Mad Tea-Party [hare]
VIII. The Queen’s Croquet-Ground [flamingo]
IX. The Mock Turtle’s Story [fish]
X. The Lobster Quadrille [lobster]
XI. Who Stole the Tarts? [SCALES OF JUSTICE]
XII. Alice’s Evidence [VIRGO]
This doesn’t look, in itself, wholly zodiacal. Where, for instance, are the twins? The lion? Well, obviously, they are in Looking-Glass:
I. Looking-Glass House [?]
II. The Garden of Live Flowers [flowers]
III. Looking-Glass Insects [insects]
IV. Tweedledum And Tweedledee [TWINS]
V. Wool and Water [sheep/ram]
VI. Humpty Dumpty [shell]
VII. The Lion and the Unicorn [lion]
VIII. “It’s my own Invention” [man + horse = centaur]
IX. Queen Alice [?]
X. Shaking [?]
XI. Waking [?]
XII. Which Dreamed it? [?]
In other words, the true zodiacal Alice emerges when we superpose the latter design upon the former, thus:
I Down the Rabbit-Hole [Alice = VIRGO]
II. The Pool of Tears [WATER]
III. Looking-Glass Insects [goat and scorpion]
IV. Tweedledum And Tweedledee [TWINS]
V. Wool and Water [ram]
VI. Humpty Dumpty [bull]
VII. The Lion and the Unicorn [lion]
VIII. “It’s my own Invention” [centaur]
IX. The Mock Turtle’s Story [fish]
X. The Lobster Quadrille [crab (= lobster)]
XI. Who Stole the Tarts? [SCALES OF JUSTICE]
XII. Alice’s Evidence/Which Dreamed it? [Alice = VIRGO]
The doubling of signs in the third chapter, there, follows from the fact that (in Looking-Glass) this chapter leaps two squares on the chessboard instead of one, which is to say moves at double speed. It is the chapter containing both the actual goat (‘a Goat, that was sitting next to the gentleman in white, shut his eyes and said in a loud voice, “She ought to know her way to the ticket-office, even if she doesn’t know her alphabet!”’) whose beard Alice actually grasps in fright when the railway carriage ‘rises up’ suddenly—and then, in a new, unrelated episode, all the insects. A scorpion, as entomologists will tell you, is not actually an insect: it’s an arachnid of the order scorpiones. But the ancients did not make this distinction (that is, they considered it an insect): and the lack of actual scorpions in the landscapes of England—upon which Wonderland riffs—necessitates its replacement with the gnat and other insects of this episode. Humpty Dumpty, though bullish, is not actually a bull. But he is (with his mouth and therefore, we must suppose, alimentary canal) not a sphere or ovoid but a torus; a taurus; exactly the kind of pun in which the mathematically expert Carroll would delight. It is also relevant that Alice herself (born 4th May 1852) was herself a taurus.

The starsign ‘cancer’, though conventionally a crab today, was indifferently a crab or a lobster in medieval and ancient understanding (καρκίνος, whence the Latin cancer, comes from the pincers or claws of the beast. Of either beast.)

What is so appealing about this superposed Alice pattern is that it starts with ‘virgo’, Alice herself, and ends there again, in twelve chapters moving through the various animal and other signs in a celestial, wondrous (‘wonderland’) circle to return again home.


++++++++++++

Do I genuinely believe that Lewis Carroll sat down and plotted out a complex zodiacal patterning, to run across his two twelve-chapter volumes of Alice’s adventures? No, I don’t. It’s extremely unlikely anything like this was ever in Carroll’s mind. 

I lay this out here as an exercise in interpretation as such. In an earlier blogpost I did something similar with C S Lewis’s Narnia and Mithraism: that post being an oblique engagement with Ward's Planet Narnia book, and a way of thinking aloud, in a performative way, about what counts as ‘evidence’ in literary criticism. This is what strikes me: though the premise of this post is, in a sense, arbitrary—the coincidence of there being twelve zodiac signs and the fact that each Alice book has twelve chapters—and although there is no evidence that Carroll himself thought zodiacally about his creation, or anything else, as I worked-out the comparison I found myself strangely compelled by it, almost convinced. After all: Tweedledum and Tweedledee! The Twins! Gemini! The lion and the unicorn! Once you start looking, you find these things everywhere.

Even elements that, manifestly, don’t fit the schema—most obviously the lack of any bull in either story (an animal Carroll could very easily have included if he’d wanted to)—become nodes of significance. Alice’s own star-sign was taurus: perhaps that is why ‘taurus’ is represented not by an actual bull, but by an egg, that ovoid symbol of origins and birth (the egg from which Helen was hatched, to which all the mighty legends of Troy and Odysseus’s wanderings can be traced back). It’s nonsense, but by locating it, and writing it out, it starts to acquire strange power over you. 

This is a dangerous path, I’m well aware. It’s how people end up believing the measurements of the Great Pyramid at Giza encode the Hebrew Bible (or is it the other way around?) or that Shakespeare’s plays contain elaborate codes proving Baconian authorship: evidence, howsoever tenuous, is presented as evidence and absence of evidence is also presented as evidence. It locks itself around the mind, like the circle (cancer) made by the connected claws of the lobster.



Wednesday, 1 February 2023

Fantasy As History



:1:

I am presently working on a History of Fantasy, and one thesis I'm looking to argue is that contemporary Fantasy is, amongst other things, a mode of historical fiction:—that genre Fantasy is one of the ways the historical novel has evolved as a form, out of the fiction of Walter Scott and his nineteenth-century imitators (Scott’s own novels were sometimes actually fantastical, more usually borderline or ‘Scooby-Doo’ fantastical and more usually still purely mimetic). So we might say that Lord of the Rings is ‘about’ medieval and Anglo-Saxon Europe as well as being about an inexistent imaginary realm with wizards and dragons and so on; that A Song of Ice and Fire is about the Wars of the Roses, the Campbells and MacDonalds, about nascent Early Modern European imperialism and so on.

So that's what I'm going to try to argue in this post: Fantasy is one of the ways we ‘do’ history, nowadays. Sometimes this fact is, I suppose, deplored: lecturers complaining that students' sense of the Middle Ages derives not from historical studies but from watching Game of Thrones let's say. Then again, this is actually sometimes actively celebrated: in this 2021 paper on pedagogy Sarah Spalding endorses using Game of Thrones to ‘game the classroom’ by way of overcoming student resistance to a topic perceived as boring (it ‘can serve as a solution to the issue of engaging majors and non-majors alike in courses where students feel as though they are “forced” to enroll’) and a Boston University professor called Phillip Haberkern uses examples from George R R Martin’s Fantasy realm to focus his history student’s minds on actual questions of European history.

Presumably the logic here is: students are assumed to be able to differentiate between those elements in the TV show that illuminate actual medieval history—power battles between great houses, say—and ignore those elements (dragons, magic, ice-zombies) that don’t. But presumably the reason students are familiar with this TV show, and not with regular historical novels, is at least in part because of the magic and dragons and zombies. These things are where history (dull, factual, fixed) is enlivened, enchanted, made more exciting and thrilling. Likewise, we read A Song of Ice and Fire uncertain as to who will win the civil war in Westeros, where we study the Wars of the Roses already know how it ends. Actual history, in other words, exists under the rubric of spoilers. And today’s fandoms absolutely hate spoilers.

But of course there are problems with this. A stark way of putting it would be to say that Fantasy inevitably falsifies history. But of course it does, because Fantasy (like SF) aims not at mimesis but imaginative recreation; its relation to reality is creative, ironic, differential. But a more nuanced position would note that all the ways we view history distort it—or, if we prefer less aggressive language, frame and contextualise it. Fantasy has the advantage of up-fronting its bias.

This is a basic point about history and the historical imagination: all the way back in 1961 (itself now, ironically, a historical period) E L Carr’s What Is History elegantly argues that history is not simply the accumulation of facts about the past—that the selection of facts, their arrangement into narratives (of incident, of causation, of might-have-beens) is never neutral. We are all products of our own time; we read historical data through various lenses, political, cultural, personal. George R R Martin writes in reaction to Tolkien, moved in part by a sense that Tolkien misrepresents medieval history by omitting the realpolitik, the money, the material practicalities of mustering armies and negotiating treaties and so on. Tolkien might, were he willing to move the upturned glass around the Ouija-board of Fantasy fandom, object that Martin himself omits crucial aspects of the medieval worldview. That those eminently modern aspects of international politic-ing say nothing about more fundamental ways in which medieval men and women related to their world.

But yes: let’s say Fantasy as a modern genre is in some sense ‘about’ the past (and ‘science fiction’ in some sense is ‘about’ the future—either set in the future, or else about the forces in the now that are dragging us into the avenir—often technological, sometimes social). The distinction is more complex than that, for SF can sometimes be about the past. But let’s go with this for now.

For a conservative like Tolkien there’s an important sense in which the past is ‘better’ than the now. For him, modernity is a decline, and his art is amongst other things a reaction against progress, against social change, industrialisation, the deracination of culture and society—it is a nostalgia for how things used to be, and a desire to retreat into such a world: the bourgeois world of eighteenth-century provincial living in the shire, the chivalric world of medieval Europe in Gondor, the heroic world of Anglo-Saxon warrior society in Rohan. It was on these grounds that Moorcock attacked Tolkien as merely reactionary. But this view of history is not uniquely right-wing. Tolkien was conservative, yes, but William Morris was a revolutionary socialist and he too believed the past better than the present: his fantasy-utopia News From Nowhere is notionally set in the future but substantively set in the past, an idealised small-scale rural England of Morris’s dreams.

It seems to me that both Left and Right are good at spotting the mote in the other’s eye and bad at the beam in their own. Perhaps you see modernity in terms of a fragmentation of the values of community, faith, family, those hearths in which human flourishing is best achieved, replacing traditional world of respect, honour, fidelity, gratitude and love with a homo hominis lupus wasteland of individuated profitmongering and competition and the dissolution of all values of human respect and self-respect.

But you might be a radical Leftist who believes, essentially, the same thing: that the communitarian possibilities of cooperation, productive labour, freedom, dignity and human flourishing have been replaced by Capitalist (or as people say nowadays, Neoliberal) expropriation, wage-enslavement, corporatisation, commodification, a homo hominis lupo dystopia striated by misogyny, racism, and so on. Climate change activists talk of ‘the anthropocene’. Some date the emergence of this new epoch from the industrial revolution, when human technological and mechanical developments began directly to affect the larger human environment. Alternately, the ‘Orbis Spike’ (a thesis argued by Lewis and Maslin) dates the emergence of the anthropocene not to the industrial revolution but to the first colonial settlers arriving in North America, and see the woes of today less as a feature of industrialised neoliberalism and more as a function of imperial expropriation and enslavement. Both right and left may deplore the depredations (environmental and social) of anthropocene, though one group may locate the origins of this new epoch in the industrial revolution and the saturation of new technologies, where the other might talk of the ‘Orbis Spike’ (a thesis adopted from Lewis and Maslin) and see the Anthropocene as a catastrophe of imperialism, slavery, genocide and global expropriation.

I mentioned Carr, a few paragraphs up. Here’s what he says about the myth of, and objections to, ‘progress’:
In ordinary life we are more often involved than we sometimes care to admit in the necessity of preferring the lesser evil, or of doing evil that good may come. In history the question is sometimes discussed under the rubric ‘the cost of progress’ or ‘the price of revolution.’ This is misleading. As Bacon says in the essay On Innovations, ‘the forward retention of custom is as turbulent a thing as an innovation.’ The cost of conservation falls just as heavily on the under-privileged as the cost of innovation on those who are deprived of their privileges. The thesis that the good of some justifies the sufferings of others is implicit in all government, and is just as much a conservative as a radical doctrine.
What these views—left and right—have in common is a belief that something foundational has changed in the passage from the past into the present. That there is a substantive difference between the past and the present, such that the recreation of a past world entails the recuperation of the loss. It's possible to think that the change has been entirely positive, of course. Indeed, if you sat me down and grilled me, I might make argue exactly that. Neveretheless it's striking how rarely Fantasy novels (or Historical novels, for that matter) recreate their past lives as only nasty, brutish and short. Even when a novel engages the myriad discomforts and terrors that (I’m going to use the word: brace yourselves) actually characterised human existence for most of human history—the starvation and the cold, the terrors and the deprivations, the violence and misery—it will generally balance material deprivation with something else. Kim Stanley Robinson’s Shaman: a Novel of the Ice Age (2013) is a powerful recreation of life in prehistoric Europe. Sometimes Robinson’s tribe has enough to eat, more often they starve, sometimes becoming so thin they can feel their spines through the front of their bellies. They sometimes predate and are sometimes predated upon by animals and other humans; they wander and endure and continue. But they also have access to a shamanic dimension which casts numinous glory through their hardscrabble lives. This, the novel implies, is something that has been lost by Modernity. And the truth is Fantasy and Historical fiction is almost never as unremitting in its portrait of past hardships as Robinson is, here. Mostly the inconveniences of the past are glossed over—in Fantasy they are often replaced by magical alternatives, palantírs instead of phones, ‘healing charms’ instead of modern medicines and so on—and in many cases inconveniences are omitted altogether.


:2:  

This is the key thing: not just that the past is different to the present, but that this difference is understood as a declination. Of course there are continuities: the human body is essentially the same in the 2020s as it was in the 1020s (though it is better supported now by medical and practical prostheses); many human needs and desires, we can intuit, carry through: hunger and sex, love and community, ambition and despair—although even here, we have to accept that these are not simple universals, and that the cultural and social contexts in which we love or despair inflects the reality of those things: that courtly love is different to the experience of love filtered-through soap operas and three-minute pop songs, that accidie is not the same as clinical depression and so on. But these continuities are also construed by major differences. I'm going to identify four in particular.

One is to note that the pre-modern society was differently structured, and involved different immanent assumptions and premises, than is the modern: more strictly hierarchical, feudal, churched, informed by a warrior ethos, whose values were such things as courage, loyalty, glory. All this contrasts with the more disseminated world of bourgeois modernity, where personal loyalty has been replaced by, let's say, values of duty, honesty, reliability, hard-work and law-abiding conformism. The former might seem to us more romantic and glorious, but the latter has the advantages of civilisation, material comfort, certitude, equality.

Related to this—it is, perhaps, another way of saying the same thing—is Henry Sumner Maine’s thesis that the move from the pre-modern to the modern is a shift from a logic of status to a logic of contract. For Maine, himself a jurist and a believer in the civilising and liberatory power of universal systems of law, this change was a good thing: in a world structured by status, the high status individual might, or might not, feel bound by their word, and had leeway to do as they wished, but the low status individuals (most of society—and certainly you and me) did not, and lived at the pleasure of sometimes capricious overlords. Maine believed that contracts, by binding both parties, levelled this inequality: actual contracts (of employment, purchase, political manifestoes and so on), but also contractual relations like money and in a broader sense a belief that communities and nations were determined by a Rousseauian contract sociale. 

But it is easy to see the ways in which this change can be seen as a net loss, especially under the aegis of imaginative freedom. Contracts, it might be thought, have burgeoned like the red weed H G Wells’s invading aliens bring from Mars, and are now choking life and dreams and possibility. Charles Dickens’s masterpiece Bleak House (1853) is, amongst other things, a dystopia of the hypertrophy of the contractual. Terry Gilliam’s Brazil (1984) is another, though Gilliam balances the entangling contractualism of his world with the protagonist’s dreams in which he flies free on silver wings over a green and pleasant land, in which he can break through all the pettifogging contractual restrictions of his life to enjoy adventure, slaying monsters and having sex with beautiful damsels.

There are two other ways of framing the difference between pre-modern and modern that are, if anything, more important to Fantasy than these, and—insofar as they inform the desire of genre Fantasy as such—they will play a larger part in my history of Fantasy as a mode. The first of these is the shift from a shame to a guilt culture. The second is what Weber called disenchantment, and what Charles Taylor describes as the move from an unbuffered to a buffered sensibility—to use his terms, pre-modern sensibilities were porous, open to the wonders but also the terrors of a cosmos interpenetrated by supernatural forces and beings. Modern has ‘buffered’ our apprehensions of the world, science has banished the monsters and fairies and bogies from the woods, the universe is mapped and pinned-down and explained. Alan Jacobs’s superb essay ‘Fantasy and the Buffered Self’ (2014) uses Taylor’s thesis to explain the appeal of Fantasy: a kind of safe unbuffering, a textual space in which we can enjoy the marvellous and thrill to the dangerous that once actually interpenetrated human lives


:3:

To say that Fantasy is a kind of historical novel—a specialised kind, predicated upon enchantment rather than mimesis, upon unbuffering and liberating the buffered, contractual limitations of modern existence—is to situate the mode in the tradition of Scott. It is also implicitly to set-up grounds of discriminating ‘good’ from weaker or feeble Fantasy writing, but we’ll come back to that. I will have much to say, in what follows, about the influence of Walter Scott. The modern historical novel derives fundamentally from Scott, and so far as that is concerned I think Lukacs has it right, that Scott’s praxis is dialectical: he sets the romantic, feudal, thrilling but antiquated and outmoded past (Highlanders, Cavaliers, Saxons) against an inevitable, bourgeois, respectable, dull but civilised present (Hanoverians, Puritans, Normans)—in order to stage a synthesis: a coming-future in which the wrong-but-wromantic past still lives in the breast and imagination of the right-but-repulsive Edinburgh bourgeois lawyer and man of business. Lukacs doesn’t exactly say this—the last part, I mean—because he wants to identify Scott’s value in the extent to which he intuited what Marx later codified out of his Hegel: the dialectical materialist dynamic of history as such. What Lukacs likes about Scott is that he embodies this logic of history in his fiction (that is to say: he doesn't endorse Scott’s Toryism, and he is perfectly aware of the limitations of Scott's art: his melodrama, his schematic plotting and other things). And indeed, although on a formal level I agree that Scott is a dialectical writer, on the level of the content of his stories—the way the plots work themselves through, his characters—it seems to me that what emerges at the end of a Scott novel is more like a compromise than a synthesis.

My point is: in many contemporary historical novels—and especially Fantasy novels (where this is a very common trope)—Scottian dialectics gets replaced by a more linear Bildungsroman narrative. The pig-boy becomes a warrior or prince; the neglected village girl becomes a mighty sorceress; the character whose life is ordinary (like ours) quests through dangers and marvels that reveal him to be extraordinary. This can be satisfying, but also flattening, and it dilutes the historical imagination.

And that's the really important thing, I think. Fantasy as a mode of the historical imagination needs fully to engage with history: not just the superficial details of dress and materiel, but history in its larger dynamic, its shifts and alterations, and therefore its estrangement and potency. 

A recent example: Canadian author Miles Cameron’s Against All Gods (2022). This is the first volume in a sequence of Fantasy epics, set in a version of the Bronze Age Middle East. The story of this particular volume is a revenge plot that burgeons into a whole war between gods and mortals, and which brings a large number of characters, laying before the reader its worldbuilding. And the Bronze Age is a very different place to now. As Cameron says in his author’s note: ‘there is no money. This is a barter economy, and the relative value of gold, silver, grain or any other commodity varies from place to place and from transaction to transaction … There are no maps or charts. Most people cannot read; the ability to read is almost a magic power. Scribes hold that power … Book-keeping and accounting, like reading, are near-magical powers.’ Of course, Cameron’s note also slyly flatters us—for we can read (we are in fact reading these very words!) which aligns us with the magical powers of the word. We, you and I, the book is saying, are special.

The novel itself, however, does not actualise these differences. Or to be more precise, its itinerary of difference marks only a surface patina over a core story of familiarity; and it is that familiarity—familiarity with genre conventions, familiarity with recognisable modern characters—that is the ground of its working. This novel is like many other grimdark-esque Fantasy novels. Structurally it is linear: scenes of dialogue; scenes of fighting with swords and spears and lots of grisly bloodletting; scenes of sex; occasional chunks of exposition. Since what I say might be thought merely disobliging, I should add that this is a novel, and Cameron is a writer, with a large and enthusiastic fanbase. To check the Goodreads page for the novel is to see that people love this kind of thing, and love this specific thing in particular.

I did not like this novel. It seemed to me extruded genre product, thin and unengaging. Some of my bounce-off reaction was the rather smug way the author paraded his ‘this isn’t your regular fantasy! It’s the Bronze Age and there’s no money and only scribes can write and I’ve done lots of research!’ and then perpetrated howler after howler: ‘His brain was spinning like a chariot wheel’—but Bronze Age people located consciousness in the chest and torso, not the brain;—a scribe has a seal with a hippogriff carved on it, even though hippogriffs were invented by Ariosto in the 16th century—the ships have heavier, later-period tackle than was the case with bronze-age skiffs (‘a mainmast amidships’ ‘Aanat went back aft to one of the main hawsers’ etc) or—

—But of course it’s daft of me to object to this: this is Bronze Age cosplay, the characters’ sensibilities (gods and mortals) are all modern—as is the case in most Fantasy writing—and so far as the author and his fanbase are concerned, that’s a feature not a bug. The gods utter such resonant-transcendent Homeric sentiments as ‘Fucking idiots. We gave them too much power. They have no idea what they’re doing with it.’ The mortals are all: ‘Zos was lying, naked and oiled, on his sleeping pallet, and he had a good buzz on from the wine.’ A good buzz on. Hmm. The sex is depressingly unimaginative and all hetero—again, a very un-Bronze-Age notion, this.

And actually my problem is not that the novel gets this or that specific historical detail or mood wrong; it’s that it doesn’t really engage with ‘history’ at all, despite pretending to do so. Its characters’ sensibilities are modern, its gods agents in the imagined world much as its mortals are—the gods are more powerful, though ‘power’ is rendered here only in terms of the ability to overbear, with violence or words—all potestas, nothing of auctoritas. There’s nothing in these gods of the numinous, the transcendent, nothing of the strange, the awe-inspiring, transcendent or resplendent. This is not a dimension that Cameron reproduces in his imagined Bronze Age; although for ‘actual’ Bronze Age human beings, in their porosity of subjectivity, it was a crucial and wondrous and terrifying aspect of existence. The characters go about their various plot-driven actions, and the storylines are punctuated by interludes of purely somatic intensity (the violence, the fighting, the sex) that do nothing to estrange, to capture or embody the wonder and difference of the past as such.

Thursday, 26 January 2023

Khazad-dûm: ‘Fate of the Jews’

 


‘Greatest of all the mansions of the Dwarves,’ says Tolkien in The Silmarillion, ‘was Khazad-dûm, the Dwarrowdelf, Hadhodrond in the Elvish tongue, that was afterwards in the days of its darkness called Moria.’ In Tolkien's invented language, Khazad-dûm means something like ‘that which was dug by the dwarfs’, as in the ‘Old English’ equivalent dwarrow- [= dwarf] -delf [= delved, dug].  

In The Fellowship of the Ring, the first part of the Lord of the Rings trilogy, the fellowship pass through Moria, discover that Balin's attempt to resettle the great Dwarvish realm had been defeated, and afterwards flee from orcs and a Balrog. Gandalf dies (or ‘dies’) there and the rest of the fellowship escape eastward back into the sunlight.

So, yes: dwarfs. Dwarves, as Tolkien insisted, idiosyncratically, on pluralising the word. What are they? In the invented world of Middle-Earth, they are a race of creatures, diminutive, hardy, secretive, burrowing and delving, fond of money (gold, jewels, that kind of thing), big-nosed, bearded, ‘natural’ enemies of the Aryan elves, but not in themselves wicked like Orcs, Goblins, dragons, spiders or whatnot. But what are they, beyond this in-world description? Here's Tolkien, writing to Naomi Mitchison in 1955:
I do think of the ‘Dwarves’ like Jews: at once native and alien in their habitations, speaking the languages of the country, but with an accent due to their own private tongue. [Letters, 229]
And in an interview with the BBC in 1965, Tolkien said this:
But the Dwarves are, of course, quite obviously, couldn’t you say they remind you of the Jews? All their words are Semitic, obviously-constructed to be Semitic. [quoted in Zak Cramer, ‘Jewish Influences in Middle-Earth’ Mallorn 44 (2006), 9]
Cramer, in that article, notes that the Dwarfish battle cry, as uttered by Gimli at the Battle of the Hornberg—Baruk Khazadl! (‘Axes of the Dwarves!’)—takes a Jewish form: Baruch is Hebrew, as in the blessing that starts the Friday shabbat meal, baruch atah adonai, ‘blessed are you, O Lord God’.

What about Khazad though, the Dwarfish word for Dwarf? Zak Cramer's interesting article doesn't consider this, but it's obvious enough where Tolkien has sourced this word: it's Khazar.

The Khazars were a semi-nomadic Turkic people who from the 6th-century onwards dominated a stretch of land across south-west Russia, Ukraine, Crimea, and Kazakhstan (which nation is named after them). ‘Khazaria became one of the foremost trading empires of the early medieval world, commanding the western marches of the Silk Road and playing a key commercial role as a crossroad between China, the Middle East and Kievan Rus’. And here's the thing: nowadays we understand that the Khazars were a multi-ethnic population, including various Pagan, Tengrist, Jewish, Christian and Muslim populations. But, in the later nineteenth century the assumption in the west was that the Khazars were Jews—were in fact a distinct Jewish people known as the ‘Mountain Jews.’ (Despite their importance, the Khazars did not leave a literary heritage that impinged on Western traditions, and 19th-century European cultural and archeological of the Caucausus was limited). Hence you get statements like this [Henry Howarth's ‘The Khazars’, Travaux de la Troisième Session du Congrès International des Orientalistes (E J Brill 1879), 141]:


This was the intellectual tradition out of which Tolkien worked: for him the Khazars were Mountain Jews. Khazad-dûm, or its homophone Khazar-doom, is the doom of the mountain Jews: their fate, the judgment passed upon them: namely, wealth, glory, greed that unearths a fiery demon from below and their terrible destruction. Isn't all this a touch anti-Semitic? Hard to deny, really.

It's complex, this. Tolkien was not necessarily personally anti-Semitic. His 1938 letter is well known and rightly celebrated: written (perhaps sent, perhaps not: but certainly written) to a German publisher who was prepared to offer good money for the translation rights to The Hobbit, but who required, under the Nazi race laws, that Tolkien confirm that he was not a Jew: ‘I have many Jewish friends, and should regret giving any colour to the notion that I subscribed to the wholly pernicious and unscientific race-doctrine ... if I am to understand that you are enquiring whether I am of Jewish origin, I can only reply that I regret that I appear to have no ancestors of that gifted people’. At this point in his life, Tolkien certainly needed the money this translation would have brought him, and there is something splendid in the certitude with which he repudiates racism here. Nonetheless, he was a man of his era, his imagination conceived the world in part in racial terms, and the ‘mountain Jews’ clearly inform his dwarfish, dwarvish, characters.

Sunday, 15 January 2023

“Avatar: The Way of Water” (dir. James Cameron, 2022)


 This isn’t a review of Cameron’s second Avatar movie: Avatar: the Way of Water. You don’t need another review of this film, I know. I will just briefly note that it’s basically the same movie as the first one but with added water, that its story is strung together from a series of statements, hard to disagree with but not in themselves inherently dramatic (‘white settlers persecuting Native Americans was bad!’ ‘The Vietnam war was bad!’ ‘Whaling is bad!’ ‘Family is good!’)—and that the storylines are all refried from elsewhere: Moby Dick plus Androcles and the Lion, Apocalypse Now plus Titanic and so on. I will add that the alien-world visuals are very colourful and detailed without being especially immersive or moving or remarkable, that the actions sequences are lively without being in the least bit tense or exhilarating, and that everything in this movie is too long, way too long, way way too long. This movie is too long.

Instead of a review, I am going to notate an annoyance I had concerning the movie’s worldbuilding and the logic of its representation. You are free to dismiss me as a crank, a pedant and a killjoy, for I am, it is true, all three of those things. But I think there’s a larger point here.

So: the ‘avatars’ themselves. As we learned in the first movie, the aboriginal population of the planet Pandora are the Na’vi, 9-ft-tall blue-skinned humanoid aliens, with elf-ears, tails and a mystic-electrical dreadlock with which they can plug-in to other mystical-electrical aspects of their natural world, mind-melding with dragons in order to ride them through the sky and so on. Earthlings have come to this planet to extract its valuable mineral ‘unobtanium’, an element that makes huge chunks of landscape float in the sky. But humans cannot breathe the Pandoran atmosphere. So humanity has developed ‘avatars’, cloned (one assumes) organic bodies shaped like native Pandorans, which human pilots remotely control by lying in special immersive VR tanks.

There’s lots that is handwavy about all this, especially towards the end of the first movie where the human protagonist Jake Sully not only remote-controls his avatar but mystically unifies his consciousness absolutely with it (via the mystic-electricity of Pandora’s world-tree). Thereafter he is not remote-controlling his avatar, his avatar has become his body.

Now, you might well say that there’s no point in objecting to the industrial-grade Cartesian pineal-gland bollocks of this. It’s the set-up for everything, and without it the whole film series couldn’t exist. So let us swallow that camel, for I have a gnat I wish to strain at. 

Avatar 1 pitches heroic Sully against a savagely violent human military officer, played by Stephen Lang, who is set on extirpating the Na’vi and destroying Pandora’s ecosystem. In a review of the first film Nick Mamatas called this character ‘Sergeant McRapeTheEarth, and that’s the name by which I’ve thought of him ever since. He dies at the end of Avatar but rather than gussy-up a new villain for episode 2 Cameron has him resurrected at the beginning of Avatar: the Way of Water. The shift is this: Sgt McRapeTheEarth’s consciousness and memories were previously downloaded onto a flash drive, which means they can be uploaded into a specially grown avatar body.

This is the main dynamic of this second film: McRapeTheEarth’s avatar, not remote-controlled but literally containing the we-might-as-well-say soul of the dead soldier, pursuing Sully’s avatar from forest to seashore, with lots of fighting and explosions and whatnot. At one point McRapeTheEarth, in Na’vi avatar form, goes to the site of the battle from the end of the first Avatar movie and discovers his own corpse, a Na’vi arrow still sticking out of it. He picks up his own skull in his gigantic blue hand in what looks like is going to be a Hamlet moment; but instead of discoursing on mortality he crushes it to dust with one mighty squeeze. Hah!

The camel I have swallowed is: that we have souls (souls which, moreover, can be recorded onto flash drives and uploaded into other bodies) and that the ‘avatar’ bodies are not just fleshy robot suits but actual bodies—in this film Sully has married his Na’vi girlfriend and fathered multiple children upon her, which means his avatar produces sperm and is able to pass on its DNA. Pretty sophisticated tech! But alright, I swallow all that. Here’s what I can’t swallow:

Sam Worthington’s avatar sounds exactly like Sam Worthington did when he was a human, just as McRapeTheEarth returns in Na’vi form with exactly the same voice as he had before. But his voice-box must, surely, be a different shape now, and is certain of much larger dimensions, and his new chest is perhaps twice the capacity of his human one. He ought to speak with a really deep and booming voice. He doesn’t. We can take this as a convention of representation: alright, the Na’vi are our p.o.v. characters, so have them speak ‘like us’. But in that case the least Cameron could do is have the human characters communicate in high-pitched, squeaky, pinky-perky Tiny Tim voices. I honestly feel cheated that he didn’t do this.

Part of my problem is that the movies make such ostentatious show of attending to questions of ‘verisimilitude’. All the helicopters and giant boats and submarines are scrupulously designed to work just as such machines would work if they were real. All that hyper-highdef SFX, all these intricately interlocking thought-through ecologies, and yet no squeaky-voiced homo sapiens? Pff.

The more I thought about this, the more it irked me. It’s the pea underneath the hundreds of Cameronian mattresses that prevents me from getting a good night’s sleep—and how I wanted to sleep, sitting through the three hundred straight hours of this interminable movie. It leads to other problems. So, the reason humans have returned to Pandora for Film 2 is no longer to mine floaty unobtainium, but to hunt the whales, or the alien whale equivalents, which they do ruthlessly and cruelly, even though they know the ET-whales are highly intelligent, sensitive and emotional beings. The reason for the hunting is that the spacewhales produce an amber liquid inside their giant brains that, we are vouchsafed in a gobsmacking aside, reverses human aging.

This means that Earth has (a) the technology to keep our bodies endlessly young, and (b) the technology, as per Richard Morgan’s Altered Carbon books, to download human consciousness and then upload it into new bodies, combined with (c) the ability to grow cloned bodies so close to the original that they generate their own sperm and, one presumes, eggs. Add these together and Earth has solved death and created immortality. That’s the story, right there. If there’s something ‘in’ the spacewhale’s brainjuice that reverses aging, then find out what it is, synthesise it, and give it to everyone, keeping a store of cloned bodies and downloaded consciousnesses to cover occasional deaths by accident and so on: everyone’s immortal. Why are we piddling around in these lagoons spearing sushi with a stick? We’re gods now!

This, though it seems to me a major worldbuilding hole, doesn’t irritate me so much as the voice thing.

Thursday, 29 December 2022

‘Best SFF of 2022’: the Excellent Unincludeds


Every year The Guardian asks various people to write brief ‘Best Of’ round-up posts of different genres of book. I was asked for my top five SFF novels of 2022, and you can read what I wrote here (my five, in case you can't be bothered to click that link, being: Harry Josephine Giles's Clarke-winning Deep Wheel Orcadia; RF Kuang's Babel; Emily St John Mandel's Sea of Tranquility; Paul McAuley's Beyond the Burn Line and Tochi Onyebuchi's Goliath).

Some years ago the format was different: we were allowed to choose as many ‘best of’ titles as we could fit into 800 words. Now we are asked to limit ourselves to five titles. It is, of course, an artificial exercise, restricting the production of a whole year’s SF to a number countable on one hand. Nonetheless, I do enjoy compiling the list. Of course it means that no fiction by me can ever make the Guardian's best-of-SF; but I daresay it wouldn't even if somebody else were doing it. So that's no great loss.

How do I go about assembling a list like this? In any given year I read a lot of books: some books I buy, others are sent to me—by publishers, for review, because I’m a prize judge. This last process results in a large influx, actually. A year in which I judge the Kitschies, or the World Fantasy Award, or whatever, will be a year in which I necessarily read a large amount of SFF. I did do some prize-judging in 2022, although for the Orwell Prize, which rewards political fiction. For the first half of 2022 my duties on this panel rather crowded out my other reading, and though some of the books submitted to the judges were SFnal and Fantasy, most weren’t. Still, I love SF and Fantasy and always read a lot of it, classic and contemporary. I generally read the big award shortlists each year, for instance, try to keep up with what's being reviewed, and often just buy a book because I like the sound of it, or am taken by the cover art, or at random. When the commission for the Guardian Best-Of came through in October I already had a sense of what I had liked amongst all that. I then solicited other peoples’ favourite SFF titles on Facebook and elsewhere. Folk were generous with their suggestions, some of which I had read, some not. By this stage in the year my Orwell judging had finished, so I was able to devote some time to tracking down and reading many of these suggestions.

This is not an absolutely comprehensive process, of course. I did not read, and could not have read, literally every SFF title published this year. But by the time I submitted copy (in November) I’d read a pretty good spread.

Of course, there are constraints on my selection, and that’s what I’m blogging about today. Which is to say there were a number of really good SFF novels that came out in 2022 which I could not include on the Guardian list, for reasons of partiality, or conflicts of interest. Justine, the Books' editor, is scrupulous about this, and quite rightly. It’s what Private Eye mocks, year after year: ‘best books of the year’ pieces which plug books by the writer’s friends, spouses, children etc. I can see how this happens, and it needn’t be absolutely venal: when a friend publishes a book, of course you will want to read it and if you have a lot of friends in the worlds of writing and publishing then this kind of reading can occupy a lot of your time, such that when you’re asked for your opinion on the year’s best books your mind will gravitate to these titles. More, it is possible (of course!) that a friend's or spouse’s book just is genuinely good. Still, I take seriously the requirement that I do not turn the Guardian’s ‘Best SF of the Year’ piece into an exercise in mere friend-puffing.

In one sense this is quite hard: the world of SF publishing is a narrow one, and any writer is liable to bump into people in it. If I operated an absolutist policy it would become pinching. For example: I know Paul McAuley a little, though he and I are not close friends (I bought my copy of Beyond the Burn Line with my own money, and read it on my own time; it really is excellent). Or again: I appeared on a panel—virtually, in this covidious age of Zoom—with R F Kuang (it was a session in which previous deliverers of the annual Tolkien lecture at Pembroke assembled for a round-table). But I don’t know her personally, and it would be harsh indeed to Babel, a fascinating novel, to exclude it from my list on such a flimsy acquaintance. But I have to draw the line somewhere, and this is where I draw it: if I actually am friends with an author, or if I have blurbed their book, I can’t in good conscience include it on my list.

On the one hand, it's not as bad as it might be: I am not a very sociable person, and do not have a particularly wide circle of friends; nor am I especially notable or prominent in SF circles. On the other hand this policy affected some of the best books I read in 2022. You might want to argue I’m being over-scrupulous, though I do feel that the world of publishing is already plenty sclerotic with this kind of metaphorical insider-dealing, undeclared interests and influence-, friendship- and nepo-networks, and the least I can do is not add to it.

At any rate I want to use this end-of-year blogpost to mention some of 2022’s very best SF and Fantasy novels, and apologise to their authors for not including them in the Grauniad’s list. To my friends I say: there is plenty of time to shun me in 2023, break-off all contact, bad-mouth me on social media, cancel me etc, and then (assuming the paper ask me again next year) I’ll be able to recommend your new work with a clear conscience. But for now, here, in no particular order, are books that I didn’t feel, despite their excellence, I could include in my roundup. I’m choosing six, to go one-beyond the limit of five under which I previously laboured.


Will Wiles, The Last Blade Priest (Angry Robot 2022)

An extraordinary Fantasy novel, by one of the UK’s best contemporary writers. It manages to provide all the satisfactions of a ‘conventional’ or genre Fantasy book whilst also estranging and engaging the mode in wonderful new ways. But Will is a friend, I read the book in MS (and blurbed it) and I couldn’t include it. Here’s an interview I hosted on my Notebook/blog with Will about the novel.


E J Swift, The Coral Bones (Unsung Stories 2022)

This is a beautiful, richly written and superbly alive novel about climate collapse, human love and human endurance, layering three stories past present and future in and around the Great Barrier Reef. I’ve met Swift several times, and whilst she and I are not friends I was lucky enough to be sent this novel in MS, and I blurbed it (you can see what I wrote on the publisher’s website). I expect to see this book widely represented in the coming awards season: it's a stunner.


James Smythe, The Ends (HarperVoyager 2022)

This is the fourth and final volume in Smythe’s Anomaly quartet, and it is extraordinary. I liked but couldn’t altogether love the first volume in this series, but as it has gone on, telling specific stories in each volume that also connect and resonate across all four, the Quartet has grown in my esteem—if it didn’t sound too pretentious, I’d call it a SFnal version of Eliot’s Four Quartets, working-through similar fascinations: memory, belonging, exploring and homecoming. And this final volume, in which the Anomaly finally reaches Earth, is the best of the lot, a marvellous cope-stone to the series. Smythe contrives a gripping story that also brings the themes of the whole into superb constellation. Way to stick the landing, James.


M D Lachlan, Celestial (Gollancz 2022)

A smartly constructed alt-historical moon adventure: in this novel’s 1977 both the Soviets and the Americans are exploring the moon, and the story starts with a mysterious hatch being discovered on the lunar surface. I thoroughly enjoyed this book, and read it in one go: propulsive, ingenious, in places period-appropriate pyschedelic, a very good SF novel. But Mark Barrowcliffe (the man behind the pseudonym) is a friend, and I blurbed it. 

Lavie Tidhar, Neom (Tachyon 2022) 

‘Neom’ is in the news at the moment (obviously it’ll never happen; though it makes a brilliant setting for imaginative writing)—and this gorgeous novel, set in Tidhar’s ‘Central Station’ future, is as good as anything he has written: richly imaginative, pin-sharp, a brilliantly deft piece of worldbuilding and storytelling. Tidhar is a powerhouse of contemporary SFF, a major voice; but he’s also a friend of mine. You can see my blurb for the book in the above image, although the publisher has, wisely, replaced it with one by a more famous figure than I for later editions.



Tori Bovalino, Not Good For Maidens (Titan 2022)

The elevator pitch for this book might be: a dark YA fantasy, based on Christina Rossetti’s Goblin Market. The book itself is exactly as rich, atmospheric, Gothily queer and wonderful as that suggests. Rossetti’s poem is one for which I have a particular fondness, which perhaps predisposed me to like this novel; but I am also (or was also: she has now passed her viva) on the supervisory team for Tori’s creative writing PhD at RHUL. She is a brilliant writer of YA, and is going to be huge.






Friday, 16 December 2022

‘Pinocchio’ (2022: directed by Guillermo del Toro and Mark Gustafson)

 


The buzz on del Toro’s Pinocchio (Netflix 2022) was very promising (Mark Kermode thought it a near flawless five-star masterpiece) so I sat down to watch with high hopes. Those hopes, however, were not fulfilled. Disappointment!

Hi diddle dee-dee, this movie’s not for me. I thought it dreary, plodding, ponderous, draggingly slow. The animation is painstaking and very detailed but lacks any sprightliness or pep. The characters move and interact as if pushing through transparent treacle, every last gesture and twist and flick over-telegraphed. The design has moments of striking Del-Toroesque Goth-appeal, but a movie cannot exist purely on its design. What about everything else? The voice acting is underpar: David Bradley plays Geppetto with an unlikeable querulousness; Christoph Waltz delivers a haphazard, overwrought performance as the villainous Volpe; and whenever Ewan McGregor’s Sebastian J. Cricket was on screen I found myself thinking back to Toast of London, in the recording booth, with Clem Fandango on the other side of the glass: ‘that’s great Ewan, really great: could you do it again, make it a little more likeable? Great—and again please? One more time please. OK we'll go again.’ Fire the nuculire weapons!

The attempts at humour, without exception, misfire: a problem both with the conception of the comic moments themselves (the cricket is squashed! again! and again!) and with the timing of them. The timing is out for most of the story beats, actually. Also the plot makes little sense. Do I apply a hobgoblin-of-little-minds criterion of pedantic consistency to a fairy tale, though? Is that really what I'm doing? Say it’s not so! But a story needs to have a coherence, a logic, even if it’s not the logic of verisimilitude. My sense with this film is that the story is never quite sure how Pinoccho is supposed to figure.

So: at first the pious Catholic 1930s Italian villagers are convinced that Pinocchio is possessed by the devil. Then, instantly, he is integrated into the local school system so much that the local fascist podestà comes round to Gepetto’s house in person to rebuke him for the lad’s truancy—after missing just one day! So why didn’t Pinocchio get to school? It was because, on his way there, he was tempted away by evil circus-svengali Count Volpe—it seems Pinocchio is at one and the same time both an unremarkable ligneous boy in his hometown and a startling freak-show marvel whom people will pay top dollar just to watch. Odd, that. When Gepetto and the podestà both try to retrieve the boy from this new life of circus performing Volpe shows-off the signed contract. Except that Pinocchio (who hasn’t ever been to school, remember) can’t write, so has instead drawn a smiley face at the bottom of the document. This is treated as legally binding, with Volpe angrily threatening to bring his lawyers down on everyone, although one wonders under what provision of contract law such a document, doodled upon by an illiterate minor, would be binding. It hardly matters, anyway, because the plot then guilliotines this entire development by having Pinocchio abruptly run over and killed by a lorry. He spends a little time in an archly-conceived, plum-coloured afterlife, all dark purple sand, coffin-clad cliff-faces and skeletal rabbits playing cards, ruled over by a mauve sphinx (this character is another iteration of the blue fairy: the movie’s one and only female character). It turns out that Pinny is immortal and so back to Italy he goes.

Discovering that the boy cannot die, the podestà gets very excited: put him in the army, he cries, to fight for the patria fascista! Does he go to Gepetto and say: “old man, make me an army of such unkillable soldati”? He does not! Instead he recruits Pinocchio into youth camp, alongside his own son, trains him for a bit and then, randomly, instructs his son (who has befriended the puppet) to shoot him with a pistol and kill him. Seems a waste. I suppose his idea is to, I don’t know, toughen-up his boy. But the lad refuses, the podestà is killed by an allied bomb whistling down directly onto his head and the movie lurches into its final act.

Gepetto and Sebastian Cricket have gone in search of Pinocchio and on the way been swallowed by a giant dogfish—a whale in Disney’s version of course, though it’s a huge dogfish in Collodi’s original 1883 novel. In the novel, though, Pinocchio and Geppetto easily escape; this film’s denouement, in which Sebastian hatches an elaborate plan to climb out through the fish’s ‘blowhole’ (a stoma that squalus acanthias, being a species of fish rather than mammals, does not possess) draws on Disney rather than Collodi.

Pinocchio blows-up the dogfish and dies, which is no biggie since he is immortal; but—oh no!—down in the mortal world Geppetto is drowning. P is told that if he wants to go straight back to life, instead of waiting the arbitrarily imposed ten minutes (or whatever) lag-time, then he must sacrifice his immortality. He gladly does this, goes back, saves his father and dies in the process. Except that then he’s brought back to life anyway. It’s a confusing zig-zag that is trying to tug your heartstrings, but which just leaves you baffled.

Then there are the songs. The songs are awful. Utterly unmemorable. Impossible to imagine any one of these smeary dollops being remembered 80 days from now, never mind 80 years—the way ‘When You Wish Upon a Star’, ‘Give A Little Whistle’, ‘Hi-Diddle-Dee-Dee’ and ‘I've Got No Strings’ are still universally recognised and loved.

Bringing in Disney, of course, tips my hand. It is unfair, and arguably point-missing, to compare this movie to to the peerless Disney Pinocchio (1940)—Del Toro is clearly, indeed rather clangingly, not trying to remake the beloved Disney original (unlike the dire Roger Zemeckis retread). That's fair enough. My problem is not that Del Toro’s approach is stylistically and tonally unlike Disney’s (although the animation certainly misses the sprightliness and life Disney’s team achieved), or that he has moved the story from a nonspecific 19th-C milieu to a specific, fascist-Italian 1930s/40s one. It is that his film creaks, lumbers, misses, bores, outstays its welcome. That it doesn't work.

‘But,’ you will say, ‘how can you nitpick and picknit at the plot logic of Del Torro’s movie and overlook the daftness of the original plot?’ I agree, the plot of the 1940 movie is just as illogical in its way as this 2022 one. But I would argue that the aporiae in the 1940 movie’s plotting are, actually, expressive of the movie’s key concerns, in a way that isn’t true of the 2022 film.

For example: in the 1940 movie, naughty boys, including P., are inveigled by a mysterious ‘Coachman’ to voyage to Pleasure Island. Here they are indulged with champagne, cigars, all the food they can eat, gaming tables, and an island-ful of fine things for them to vandalise—to smash, wreck and ruin. The Mona Lisa is there! And those naughty boys have defaced it! 



But it’s all a ruse: there is some magic on the island that means, the more the boys misbehave, the quicker they turn into jackasses: literal donkeys, which the Coachman then ships off and sells, to hard labour in salt mines and suchlike.

But think about this for a moment, under rubric of a business proposition. How much does it cost the Coachman to fit-out Pleasure Island? Never mind the endless booze and cigars, food, sundry costs of portage, the labour required to herd and ship-out the finished-product donkeys. What about the paintings? In 1962, the Louvre insured the Mona Lisa for $100 million (about a billion dollars in 2022 cash). 

Long story short: there really has to be a cheaper way to produce jackasses, so as to sell them on at profit.

And of course there is! It’s called ‘sex’. You get a mummy donkey and a daddy donkey together and, via a special kind of donkey cuddle, a baby donkey gets born. Certainly cheaper, and therefore more profitable, than the Coachman’s method.

Of course I’m being deliberately obtuse. We are not expected to read this sequence literally. It’s a piece of fabulation, talking metaphorically rather than mimetically: it's saying ‘allow a boy to behave badly and follow his bestial instincts and he will turn into a jackass’. That’s a way of telling a moral story, in a dramatic and visually arresting way. You could make the same argument about the oddities of plotting in the Del Toro movie.

But I’d argue the 1940 Pinocchio is doing something else with the Pleasure Island sequence. It hinges on the question above. Isn’t there a cheaper, more efficient way of ‘making’ donkeys? Obviously there is. Sex. But in the world of Pinocchio sex is precisely what is missing, what is taboo or interdicted—because it’s a children’s film, because it’s a war film and the men are all away in the army separated from their wives, or for deeper reasons. Something is broken in the logic of fertility in this colourful animated land. A cool blue-coloured fairy gifts life to a puppet (because that’s what women can do) and it comes alive, sort-of. We could say: Geppetto has made a son the hard way, constructing it like Frankenstein did his monster, rather than the easy way (I say easy: when the two of us made our son, it was my wife who did all the heavy lifting of course). But Geppetto doesn’t circumvent ‘nature’ out of hubristic arrogance, the way Frankenstein does. He does it because … well, why? Because he lives in a land without women and has no alternative, perhaps? This, it seems to me, is part of the pointedness of the movie: it is, in its brilliant, colourful, vividly-sung, often hilarious way, a kind of “Waste Land”, a film about a kind of desolation: the old world having died—to quote another famous Italian—and the new world yet to be born, we find ourselves in an interregnum in which a great variety of grotesque and wonderful symptoms appear.

What’s the equivalent for the Del Torro Pinocchio? Why the clonking relocation to Fascist Italy, turning the movie into an epigone Pan’s Labyrinth? Del Toro is, in part, saying: fascism is bad. Which, I have to agree, is true, for fascism is indeed bad; although it’s a truth not very eloquently or resonantly expressed by this movie. What else? Is the point that fascism treats human beings like puppets, disposable, controllable, mere things? Is that it? Or that fascism is a kind of malign circus act, a puppet show, all outward display and inward emptiness?

I daresay I’m both overreading and under-praising this film. Lots of people I know, whose opinions I respect, really love it. Still: it’s a Pinocchi-no from me.

Saturday, 3 December 2022

Annie Ernaux, ‘The Years’ (2008; translated by Alison L. Strayer 2017)

 

Following Ernaux's Nobel win I addressed my (deplorable, no doubt) ignorance of her work by reading this. It's acclaimed, the blurb tells me, as her masterpiece, and won the Prix Renadot in France and the Premio Strega in Italy.

It's ... fine? I guess? A deliberately bitty panorama of life in France from the 1940s to c.2000 made up of lots of short paragraphs, flashbulb moments from history and culture, news, lists of films seen and various moments from the protagonist's life: schooldays, life as a wife and mother in provincial France, working as a teacher, life post-divorce with a handsome young toyboy. Perfectly readable but, maybe, rather featherweight. It's like Billy Joel's ‘We Didn't Start The Fire’, but for France and with added bits of sex-life. Still: Nobel Prize!

Most of it is this kind of thing: ‘reserve soldiers continued to leave for Algeria ... the SS France, the Caravelle jetliner and the Concorde, the Common Market and, sooner or later, peace in Algeria. There were new francs, scoubidoo bracelets, flavoured yoghurt, milk in cartons, transistor radios’ [76]. A hundred pages later it's still going on, further down the cultural-historical line: ‘male voices compared PCs and Macs ... they mentioned the latest cover of Charlie Hebdo and the most recent episodes of The X-Files, advised us to see Man Bites Dog and Reservoir Dogs’ [179]. Every now and again the running commentary is interrupted by passages like this:

Once in a while she looks at herself naked in the bathroom mirror. A delicate torso, small breasts, very slender waist, slightly rounded belly. The thighs are heavy with a bulge above the knee. The sex is clearly visible, now that the hair is more sparse, the cleft small compared with the ones displayed in X-rated films. She is surprised. It is the same body she's had since she stopped growing at around the age of sixteen. [167]
A male novelist writing a passage like that would be, rightly I think, mocked. It is different coming from a woman's pen I suppose. Still: after a while the obliqueness of all this notated specificity grows wearisome. ‘Solidarność, the Restaurants du Coeur, the release of Mandela ... Hypermarkets expanded, shopping trolleys were replaced by others so big one could scarely touch the bottom. We changed television sets so that we could have a SCART plug and a VCR’ [141]. The boorishness of men is a repeated theme, and the way constant external change actually, paradoxically, construes a kind of inner changelessness is pretty well done. But I'm not sure the book puts the necessary distance between portraying banality, for satiric or social-commentary or even aesthetic reasons, and simply being banal.
On the internet all one needed do was enter a keyword and thousands of ‘sites’ would swarm on the screen. [208]
You don't say! ‘We could research the symptoms of throat cancer, recipes for moussaka, the age of Catherine Deneuve, the weather in Osaka, the growing of hydrangeas ...’ Yes, yes. Point taken.

It's a 200-page novel that feels like a novella, an exercise in literary Pointillism that isn't, or didn't strike me, as much more than this gimmick. But conceivably (I don't say this to snark) my reaction only reflects the boorishness of masculinity that the book, in part, critiques.

+++

Photo-Moderne, Cinémonde, German soldiers, Lillebonne
L'Hirondelle, Convent School, President de Gaulle;
De Beauvoir, long division, Les Muppets on television
Mireille Mathieu, Bjorn Borg and Emanuelle;
Bourgeois life, Maman/wife, Tirlipot, pastry slice,
Mitterand, Beatles song and Catcher in the Rye;
Panties, Debussy, visiting Seine-Saint-Denis
Canal+, reading Proust, sexual clichés home to roost.

We didn't start the Ernaux
Til her Nobel Prizing made it worth appraising
Didn't much enjoy the Ernaux
No, I'm just not sure if I will read much more of her.